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I. INTRODUCTION
An increasing awareness of environmental problems and
dwindling supplies of open land have resulted in the adoption
of land use regulations to preserve open space for a variety of
broad public objectives in many communities throughout the
nation. The regulations include flood plain zoning, wetland and
conservancy zoning, lakeshore and coastal protection districts,
agriculture and forestry zones, and scenic preservation zones, all
of which prevent or severely restrict structural development.1
State agencies 2 as well as local governmental units have been
empowered to adopt regulations to preserve private land in
an open or semi-open condition. Invariably the question arises
whether these regulations validly control or unconstitutionally
"take" private property without payment of just compensation.
Principally because this is a developing area of constitutional
law, no clear cut judicial test exists for determining whether a
1. Over the past four years the author examined approximately
350 local ordinances establishing special flood plain, conservancy,
wetland, scenic protection, and shoreland protection regulations.
2. State agencies in several states have been authorized to con-
trol flood plain use. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-3 to 25-4g,
25-7b to 25-7f (1958 and Supp. 1972) (encroachment lines); HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 205-2 (Supp. 1971) (conservation districts); IND. ANN.
STAT. §§ 27-1115, 27-1117, 27-1119 (1970) (floodway areas); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 455A.35 (Supp. 1969) (flood plain areas); KY. REv. STAT.§§ 151.220-.320 (Supp. 1968) (floodway areas); Mass. Acts and Resolves
1961, ch. 548, 554 (encroachment lines and flood plain zones); NED.
REv. STAT. §§ 2-1506.01 to .14 (1970) (commission floodways); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4348 (Supp. 1972) (flood plains); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 86.16.010-.900 (1962) (flood control zones); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 87.30 (1972) (flood plain areas).
State agencies have been authorized to adopt regulations for
preservation of coastal wetlands in other states. E.g., CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 22-7h to 22-7o (Supp. 1972); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 4701 to 4709 (Supp. 1972); Mn. ANN. CODE art. 66, §§ 718-730 (1970);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 130, § 105 (1972); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 483-A: 1
to A:5 (1968 and Supp. 1971); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 2-1-13 to 17
(Supp. 1972).
State agencies have been authorized to supervise and assist local
adoption of shoreland regulations in Minnesota and Wisconsin. MINN.
STAT. § 105.485 (1971); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 59.971, 144.26 (Supp. 1972).
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particular regulation validly controls or invalidly "takes" private
property. The Supreme Court has noted that no rigid rules are
available.3 Yet planners, lawyers, legislators, town councilmen,
and administrators, who draft, adopt, and enforce regulations,
lack information about both the factors which may be relevant to
a reviewing court and the probability of favorable or unfavora-
ble judicial reaction in a particular circumstance. This lack of
information results in unrealistic planning, misallocation of re-
sources, and inequity to landowners. A planner may recommend
that a community preserve open spaces for flood storage, recrea-
tion areas, or wildlife preserves through a plan incorporating un-
constitutionally stringent regulations. By the time the regula-
tions are held unconstitutional, scarce public funds may have al-
ready been allocated to other purposes and be unavailable for
public purchase of these areas. Landowners may be unfairly de-
prived of use of their lands and required to resort to expensive
litigation to protect their constitutional rights.
This Article is designed to clarify factors considered by courts
in determining whether particular open space regulations "take"
property. It is based upon a detailed examination of cases con-
testing the constitutionality of open space and other land use
controls.4 Hopefully, it will aid planners, lawyers and others in
3. United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 156 (1952).
4. The author collected at random approximately 500 cases con-
testing the constitutionality of zoning regulations, subdivision controls,
officials maps, building setbacks, subdivision regulations and special
regulations such as wetland controls, regulations for extraction of
sand and gravel, public nuisance laws, and sign board controls on the
ground that the regulations took private property without payment ofjust compensation. The survey was part of a 30-month study con-
ducted for the United States Water Resources Council and other federal
agencies. The study resulted in a two volume report, "Regulations
to Reduce Flood Losses", in the process of publication by the U.S.
Government Printing Office.
Although landowners contesting land use controls often argued
that the regulations took private property, surprisingly few land use
control regulations were invalidated explicitly on that ground. A care-
ful review of zoning treatises, law review articles, legal encyclopedias,
and case digests revealed only about 200 zoning cases having "taking"
as an explicit basis for invalidation. A statistical analysis of 140 of
these cases selected at random revealed the following:
1. Cases before 1950 45
1950-1960 53
1960-1970 42
2. Explicit "taking" language used by the court
"Confiscation" of property 72
"Taking" of property 47
'Deprivation" of property 55(Some opinions described the taking in several ways.)
3. Cases with one or more explicit grounds in addition to
1972]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
drafting constitutionally sound regulations and deciding when
compensation should be paid to achieve particular planning ob-
jectives.
"Unreasonable" 100
"Arbitrary" __67
"Discriminatory" 20
"Invalid objective" 14
(Many decisions cited several reasons for invalidating in addi-
tion to "taking". For example, 40 held regulations unreason-
able and arbitrary. Only 29 cited taking as a ground.)
4. Cases with some sort of cost analysis
Before 1950 19
1950-1960 22
1960-1971 27
total 68
Cases mentioning restricted and unrestrict-
ed values . . . . .. 31
Weighted mean reduction in values for
cases mentioning restricted and unrestricted
values 72%
Cases mentioning initial cost of land --- 10
Cases mentioning rent value ................... 6
For a basis of comparison 110 additional cases validating regulations
were collected which involved some sort of cost analysis.
1. Date of case
Before 1950 5
1950-1960 29
1960-1971 ------- 30
2. Cases mentioning restricted and unrestricted values ------ 24
3. Weighted mean reduction in value for cases mentioning
restricted and unrestricted values -........--- -- ...............60%
The cases suggest that: (1) arguments that regulations "take"
property continue to be a principal constitutional attack, particularly
for the more stringent controls; (2) "taking" as a basis for invalida-
tion is usually combined with one or more additional grounds; (3)
courts commonly undertake some sort of cost analysis (this is most
common with Illinois and New York courts); (4) weighted mean re-
ductions in value for cases invalidating and validating restrictions
suggest that, on the average, valid regulations do not reduce values
more than 60 to 70 per cent. However, the average 60-70% reduction
is quite misleading since the averaged values varied greatly from the
mean.
It is interesting that 233 out of 250 cases randomly selected and
statistically examined as part of this study validating or invalidating
regulations involved residential zoning. Sometimes the landowner
was dissatisfied with the specifications for residential uses because
he wished to construct a residence on a smaller lot, at a greater height,
or without meeting the other requirements of the ordinance. More
often he contested the residential classification because he wished to
construct an industrial or commercial building on his land. A few
cases contested the zoning of a residential area for commercial, indus-
trial or open space uses.
It is also interesting that courts undertook broad discussions con-
cerning the role of police power in regulating lands in only ten of
110 cases validating regulations, but in 24 out of the 140 invalidating
the regulations.
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First, open space regulations and general judicial approaches
to the issue of taking are discussed. Second, open space cases
and regulations are analyzed in light of specific factors and judi-
cial "tests" for taking. Finally, tax incentives and compensa-
tion schemes which ease the burden on a regulated landowner
are analyzed as methods of preserving the constitutionality of
regulatory schemes.
The Article does not attempt to propose a new or exclusive
test to determine whether a particular regulation takes property.
Taking has and should depend upon a balancing of the societal
benefit of a particular regulation against the impact on indi-
vidual ownership of land. Many competing equities enter into
that balancing. Most importantly, regulations can be carefully
devised in light of these factors to maximize public welfare bene-
fits while permitting some private economic uses.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES
A. OPEN SPACE REGULATIONS VS. TRADrIONAL ZoNIG
Open space regulations5 are often designed to serve a wide
range of land use management and resource protection objec-
tives.6 Whatever the specific regulatory objectives, the regu-
lations have the common characteristic of preventing or strin-
gently controlling structural development in particular areas.
Most regulations permit open uses such as agriculture, forestry,
parks, and wildlife sanctuaries.7  Although structures accessory
to these uses are sometimes permitted, permanent structures
used for habitation are usually prohibited.8
5. The term "open space zoning" is used in this article to refer
not only to traditional zoning but to a range of special wetland, flood
plain, floodway, lakeshore, coastal, scenic preservation, and other pro-
tection districts as well as building setbacks, official mapping, and
parkland dedication requirements in subdivision regulations. The ob-jectives of each of these regulations differ but all are designed to pre-
vent building construction on whole lots or portions of lots.
6. Common objectives include preservation of prime agricultural
or forestry lands, preservation of inland and coastal wetlands and areas
of special scientific interest, prevention of flood losses which would re-
sult from the location of damage-prone uses in coastal or inland
flood areas, preservation of floodways for passage of flood flows and
flood storage areas, protection of areas of special scenic, cultural, or
archaeological interest, control of urban sprawl and premature sub-
division, prevention of water pollution or unsanitary conditions which
would result from the location of domestic sewage disposal and water
supply facilities on inadequate soils, and protection of park and recrea-
tion areas.
7. See the ordinance provisions cited in notes 132, 141, 145 infra.
8. See the cases cited in notes 132, 141, 145 infra.
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Zoning has traditionally separated incompatible land uses
by establishing geographical areas for industrial, commercial and
residential use. Today, however, zoning promotes the broad pub-
lic welfare by encouraging the most appropriate land use
throughout a municipalityY But the most appropriate use for the
municipality is often not the most advantageous for the land-
owner. Allocation of lands for agriculture, parks, conservation
or other open space uses may be consistent with broad county
and state needs and yet fail to allow economically feasible private
uses. It may be that an ordinance, instead of controlling the use
that can be made of property, "deprives the property of any
use."'
0
All land use controls reduce to some extent the number and
types of land use possible, often with an accompanying reduction
in land values. The courts have made it clear that regulations
need not permit the most profitable use of lands.1 However,
there are significant distinctions between the more traditional
residential, commercial, or industrial zoning and open space zon-
ing classifications. First, since open space regulations usually
prohibit all permanent structural uses, they reduce land values
much lower than does conventional zoning.12 Second, open
space regulations are usually designed to protect scenic beauty,
9. In Robinson v. Los Angeles, 146 Cal. App. 2d 810, 814, 304 P.2d
814, 816 (1956), the court commented upon zoning as an exercise of
police powers:
The principles upholding zoning ordinances as valid exer-
cise of the police power in furtherance of the general welfare
are well established in this state. . . . "As our civic life has
developed so has the definition of 'public welfare' until it has
been held to embrace regulations 'to promote the economic
welfare, public convenience, and general prosperity of the com-
munity.'" (emphasis added, citations omitted)
In Cobble Close Farm v. Board of Adjustment, 10 N.J. 442, 452-53, 92
A.2d 4, 9 (1952) the New Jersey Supreme Court noted that:
Zoning regulations are not to be formulated or applied ...
with a design to encourage the most appropriate use of plain-
tiff's property but rather with reasonable consideration, among
other things, to the character of the district and its peculiar
suitability for particular uses, and with a view of conserving
the value of property and encouraging the most appropriate use
of land throughout such municipality.
10. Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills
Tp., 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963). Plaintiff's brief at page 7 argued
that "The instant regulation, rather than controlling the use that can
be made of property, deprives the property of any use."
11. See cases cited in notes 128, 129 infra.
12. See, e.g., Chevron Oil Company v. Beaver County, 22 Utah 2d
143, 449 P.2d 989 (1969) upholding a grazing district zoning classifica-
tion for land apparently worth 20-30 dollars per acre for grazing pur-
poses but 10,000 dollars per acre as "highway service land."
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preserve wildlife, and control water pollution and watershed
protection, rather than the traditional objectives of protecting
public health and preventing nuisances. Far less precedent can
be found for the use of police power regulations to serve these
special objectives, particularly when land values are severely re-
duced.13 Third, unlike other land use controls which provide
reciprocal benefits, 14 open space regulations benefit the regulated
landowners little, if at all. Fourth, areas placed in open space
zones are often subject to steep slope limitations, erosion, high
ground water, or flooding problems, all of which naturally limit
profitable uses. Regulations which permit only uses with mini-
mal return for these lands may render reclamation uneconomic.' 5
Since sources of public funding are limited, all private lands
needed for open space can not be purchased. Further, many
lands are in private uses which are compatible with open space
objectives. For example, private agricultural and forestry lands
can produce goods essential to local and regional economies and
still provide recreation and wildlife areas, reduce fire hazards,
and help preserve natural scenery. Where land is in productive
use and the regulations result in only partial restriction of pri-
vate use, regulations are clearly appropriate. But where lands
are to be used for active public purposes such as parks the use of
negotiated public purchase or eminent domain rather than police
power regulation is clearly desirable. Where property is not
actually appropriated, but where private uses are substantially
restricted, with resulting severe diminution in land value, the
choice between eminent domain and regulation becomes more
difficult. The choice should depend not only upon constitutional
limits of police powers but also upon basic notions of property,
13. See cases cited in notes 52, 99 infra and accompanying text
14. Traditional zoning has been, to a considerable extent, aimed
at the preservation of existing uses: e.g., protection of residences from
construction of industries. See, e.g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365 (1926); Hobart v. Collier, 3 Wis. 2d 182, 87 N.W.2d 868 (1958).
Ordinances do not prevent all economic structural uses on undeveloped
lands, only inconsistent uses. The existing uses are protected from in-
compatible uses and so are the new ones. In contrast, open space
regulations, which severely restrict private development to protect
scenic beauty, wildlife, and shore cover, often prevent uses similar to
the cottages, resorts, and residences present in an area. There is little
or no reciprocal advantage to the open lands. If no economic uses are
possible for high value and heavily taxed open space areas in their
existing condition, an ordinance can hardly be said to preserve ex-
isting use values of the undeveloped lands. It is one matter to protect
or preserve high value existing uses and another to preserve uses
which have no economic value.
15. See generally notes 150-79 infra and accompanying text.
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privacy, and justice.16 Most cases to date dealing with highly
restrictive open space zoning have invalidated the regulations.1 7
However, there are rays of hope in some of the cases,' 8 and in-
triguing directions suggested for valid regulations. 19
B. CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS
Generations of American lawyers have been raised on the
exalted view of private property held by the great English jurist
Blackstone.20 While a man's land was not his "sole and despotic
dominion" to use in a manner harmful to neighboring lands or
society even in Blackstone's time,21 private land remains today a
valuable interest protected by both state and federal constitu-
tions. The fifth amendment of the Constitution provides that
"private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without
16. See generally Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law,
80 HARv. L. REV. 1165 (1967); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74
YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
17. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 53, 99 infra.
18. See generally cases cited in notes 166-78 infra. See also Chev-
ron Oil Company v. Beaver County, 22 Utah 2d 143, 449 P.2d 989
(1969) (grazing district upheld); Norbech Village Joint Venture v.
Montgomery County Council, 254 Md. 59, 254 A.2d 700 (1969) (zoning
plan preserving open spaces and protecting watershed areas upheld).
19. See, e.g., MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals, 347 Mass. 690, 200
N.E.2d 254 (1964), 356 Mass. 635, 255 N.E.2d 347 (1970), in which the
court gave qualified endorsement to wetland preservation regulations if
the regulations permit some economic use of lands; Spiegle v. Beach
Haven, 46 N.J. 479, 218 A.2d 129 (1966), in which the court refused to
find that denial of a use in a zone of hurricane activity prevented rea-
sonable uses; Lomarch Corp. v. Mayor of Englewood, 51 N.J. 108,
237 A.2d 881 (1968), which upheld regulations preventing development
for one year in a mapped park or playground area if the munici-
pality paid for a one year option to purchase; and Chevron Oil Com-
pany v. Beaver County, 22 Utah 2d 143, 449 P.2d 989 (1969), sustaining
a grazing district classification against attack by a landowner who had
purchased lands for use contrary to existing zoning classification.
20. Blackstone stated:
There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagina-
tion, and engages the affections of mankind, as the right of
property; or that sole and despotic dominion which one man
claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in
total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the uni-
verse.
1 COOLEY'S BLACKSTONE 321 (Book II, Ch. I of W. BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND).
21. See J. BEUSCHER, LAND USE CONTROLS-CASES AND MATERIALS
1-8 (1966), in which statutes and other resource control legislation
which preceded Blackstone are reproduced. For discussion of the evolv-
ing concept of property see Cribbet, Changing Concepts in the Law of
Land Use, 50 IowA L. REV. 245 (1965); Cross, The Diminishing Foe,
20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 517 (1955).
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just compensation," 22 while the fourteenth amendment states
that no "state [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."23 The Constitution also
guarantees the "right to acquire, use, and dispose" of property.2 4
Similar provisions exist in state constitutions. 25
C. JuDiciAL APPROACHES
Courts and legal commentators have for many years strug-
gled to distinguish between the valid use of police powers and
unconstitutional "takings" which require compensation.2 0 The
tests which have evolved are neither clear nor simple. The
plaintiff has the burden of showing unconstitutionality. 7 Courts
22. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
23. Id., Amend. XIV, § 1.
24. The United States Supreme Court, in Buchanan v. Warley,
245 U.S. 60, 74 (1917), used the following language to describe Consti-
tutional protections:
Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns.
It is elementary that it includes the right to acquire, use, and
dispose of it. The Constitution protects these essential attri-
butes of property.
25. E.g., in Long Island Land Research Bureau v. Young, 7 Misc.
2d 469, 471, 159 N.Y.S.2d 414, 417 (Sup. Ct. 1957) the court stated:
Any complete sterilization of private property by legislative
fiat without compensation to the owner is confiscatory and vio-
lative of article I, (§ 7, subd. [a]) of the New York State Con-
stitution and the Fifth Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution.
26. See the following articles which discuss distinctions between
valid power regulations and unconstitutional "takings" of private prop-
perty: Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty
Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 63;
Havran, Eminent Domain and the Police Power, 5 NoTRE DA~m LAw.
380 (1930); Kratovil & Harrison, Eminent Domain-Policy and Con-
cept, 42 CAn. L. Rsv. 596 (1954); Merrill, Zoning-Eminent Domain
Versus Police Power, 50 N.J.L.J. 40 (1927); Michelman, Property, Util-
ity and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Com-
pensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165 (1967); Netherton, Implementa-
tion of Land Use Policy: Police Power vs. Eminent Domain, 3 LANm &
WATER L. REv. 33 (1968); Ryckman, Eminent Domain-Conservation, 6
NAT. REs. J. 8 (1966); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J.
36 (1964); Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YAE
L.J. 149 (1971); Comment, Landmark Preservation Laws: Compensationfor Temporary Taking, 35 U. Cm L. REv. 362 (1968); Note, The Police
Power, Eminent Domain, and the Preservation of Historic Property,
63 COL=M& L. REv. 708 (1963); Comment, Distinguishing Eminent Do-
main from Police Power and Tort, 38 WASH. L. RPv. 607 (1963); Com-
ment, 11 CALIF. L. REv. 188 (1922); Comment, 35 COLuz. L. REv. 938
(1935).
27. See, e.g., Spiegle v. Beach Haven, 46 N.J. 479, 218 A.2d 129
(1966). The court in that case noted that to maintain a contention that
a regulation is unconstitutional as a taking of private property, a land-
owner must prove that an "ordinance unduly burdens his beneficial
19721
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confine their determination of the constitutionality of a restric-
tion to the specific circumstances presented. A statute, admin-
istrative rule, or local ordinance may be unconstitutional when
applied to a particular parcel of land,28 yet constitutional other-
use of the land .... It follows that an essential element of plaintiff's
proof is the existence of some present or potential beneficial use of
which he has been deprived." Id. at 491-92, 218 A.2d at 137.
See also Vartelas v. Water Resources Commission, 146 Conn. 650,
153 A.2d 822 (1959), in which the Connecticut Supreme Court discussed
the issue of taking but held that the plaintiff, under the record as pre-
sented, was not in a position to raise such a constitutional objection.
The Connecticut Water Resources Commission, a state agency, had es-
tablished lines along the Naugatuck River beyond which no structure
or encroachment could be placed without permission of the Commis-
sion. The plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of the statute and
attacked the validity of the administrative action of the Commission on
the ground that failure to issue a permit for a proposed use deprived
the plaintiff of all economic use of his property.
Although an exhibit showed that the plaintiff had filed an appli-
cation to build a retail market fifty feet square and constructed of
cinder blocks on a poured concrete cellar and foundation, such an ap-
plication had not been established in the record before the court.
Based on the record, the court noted that "we cannot say that the
plaintiff has exhausted the remedy [of obtaining a permit] available to
him. . . ... Id. at 656, 153 A.2d at 825. The court went on to say:
We need not, however, rest our decision on the inadequacy
of the record. The commission has, at most, refused its per-
mission for the erection of a particular structure. Whether the
plaintiff could build another type of structure-for example,
one on piers or cantilevers-which would not impair the capa-
city of the channel in time of flood is a matter which the com-
mission was not asked to, and did not, pass upon.
Id.
As to the refusal by the Commission to allow construction of a
proposed market, the court stated:
[T]his action was, under the circumstances of this case, jus-
tifiable .... It did not necessarily mean that no structure
which would serve the plaintiff's purposes and permit the
economic utilization of the property in his control would be al-
lowed. Until it appears that the plaintiff has been finally de-
prived by the commission of the reasonable and proper use of
the property, it cannot be said that there has been an unconsti-
tutional taking of property without just compensation.
Id. at 657-58, 153 A.2d at 825-26.
Vartelas might be interpreted to stand for the proposition that un-
til the owner of restricted lands has submitted several permit applica-
tions for potentially beneficial uses (assuming more than one such use
is allowed under the terms of the state level regulations or local ordi-
nances) and the owner has been refused permission for each of the
uses, he cannot claim to have been deprived of all reasonable use of
his land. How many applications he would need to submit is unclear.
He might be required to submit one for each of many potentially bene-
ficial uses, or if there was only one economic use, he might be required
to submit more than one application for variations on that use.
28. See, e.g., Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). But see
Morris County Land Imp. Co. v. Parsipanny-Troy Hills Tp., 40 N.J. 539,
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wise. A successful attack on an ordinance will, however, dis-
courage a regulatory body from attempting to enforce restric-
tions in closely analogous situations.
Landowners attacking regulations as a taking of property
usually present a great mass of factual data and a variety of ad-
ditional constitutional attacks including assertions of invalid reg-
ulatory objectives, unreasonableness, and discrimination. 29 Con-
sequently trial judges face a complex decision, and yet written
opinions too often reflect only a portion of the facts which may
be relevant. Since courts commonly cite multiple constitutional
grounds for invalidating zoning regulations without clearly dis-
tinguishing the factual basis for each, decisions are often of lim-
ited precedential value.
In balancing public rights and private property interests,
courts have traditionally given great weight to regulations de-
signed to protect public safety or prevent nuisances, while aes-
thetic, wildlife, and recreational values have been afforded less
weight. The impact of regulations upon the usability of private
property is carefully examined if regulated uses lack nuisance
characteristics. Important factors in the balancing process are
purchase costs, rental value, reclamation cost, whether proposed
uses would constitute nuisances, whether proposed uses threaten
the landowner or his guests, whether an entire property or only
a portion of a property is affected by restrictions, whether the
economic deprivation is short or long term, whether existing uses
and "vested" rights or only proposed uses are involved, and tax
structure.
Although diminution in value is an important consideration,
the primary concern is whether the regulations prevent all eco-
nomic use of the land. The value of a particular site depends
in large part upon the ability of the landowner to use or dispose
of the site consistent with market demands. Generally, the
greater the number of potential uses for a site, the greater the
probability that one or more may meet a market demand, and
consequently the higher the value of land. Land use controls
which restrict use options reduce market values of land by often
preventing most profitable uses. However, as will be noted later,
courts have focused increasingly upon the effect of land use
controls in preventing recoupment of investment and less upon
the diminution in potential use or development value over and
193 A.2d 232 (1963), in which an entire ordinance provision was held
invalid.
29.. See note 4 supra,
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above such investment. The reduction in potential use of free
market value of property is a reduction in the wealth or the
worth of an individual and, if potential use value is recognized
as a vested property right, regulations which reduce potential
use value do in fact "take" property. But courts appear increas-
ingly unwilling to require compensation for reductions in value
if some economic uses (i.e., uses yielding some return over re-
coupment of investment) remain for the land.
Although a variety of tests have been posed by courts and
legal commentators for determining whether regulations validly
restrict or unconstitutionally "take" property, 0 no single test ap-
pears to be wholly satisfactory. A single test would be philo-
sophically gratifying and would ease the task of landowner, legis-
lator, or judge in deciding what is and what is not a taking.
Nevertheless, oversimplification might on the one hand unduly
limit the power of government to regulate private conduct for
the common good, or on the other hand too severely restrict the
range of circumstances in which a private property owner would
be free to use his property without fear of uncompensated gov-
ernment interference. Scholarly attempts to define precisely
the outer constitutional limits for police power regulations in re-
stricting private property without compensation are perhaps
doomed to failure as long as the role of government in guiding
conduct continues to expand and the attributes of private prop-
erty are in a state of flux. A balancing test incorporating all
these tests or competing equities provides both the most reliable
guide to the constitutionality of an open space regulation and the
most equitable solution.
30. Commentators and courts have suggested simplified tests for
determining a "taking" if (1) government physically enters and uses
private land (see discussion accompanying notes 100-107 infra); (2)
government requires landowners to bestow a public benefit (see dis-
cussion accompanying note 60 infra); (3) government substantially
diminishes land value (see discussion accompanying notes 115-22 infra);(4) regulations prevent all reasonable use of land (see discussion ac-
companying notes 123-29 infra); (5) public harm threatened by a use
outweighs landowner detriment resulting from the regulations (see dis-
cussion accompanying notes 67-69 infra; (6) there is no reciprocity in
benefits for regulated landowners or the regulated landowner does not
benefit from the evil sought to be avoided (see note 85 infra); (7)
government is functioning in a proprietary rather than arbital capacity
in regulating private uses (see text accompanying note 92 infra).
It has been suggested that no taking occurs if (1) government is
preventing threats to public health or safety (see discussion accom-
panying notes 70-79 infra); (2) government prevents a landowner from
making a nuisance of himself (see discussion accompanying notes 83-90
infra).
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D. MULTIPLE CONSTrTUTIONAL ATTACKS
A property owner with land zoned for open space "conserv-
ancy" for wildlife protection might argue that the regulations
violate due process and equal protection guarantees since similar
areas are not regulated or because similar areas are purchased
rather than regulated,31 that the regulations violate due process
guarantees because the allocation of private land to wildlife use
for public benefit is an invalid regulatory objective,32 that the
regulations violate due process guarantees because the regula-
tions are unreasonable in failing to promote the regulatory objec-
tive since the land cannot naturally sustain wildlife,33 and that
the regulations so severely restrict the use of the property that
they constitute a taking.3 4 Of the cases selected at random as
part of this study, in the 140 in which regulations were invalida-
ted on taking grounds, the courts found discrimination in 20,
arbitrariness in 67, invalid regulatory objectives in 14, and un-
reasonableness in 100. 3 5
Professor Joseph Sax's leading article on the distinctions be-
tween valid regulation and invalid taking discussed at length the
rationale for constitutional prohibitions against taking without
compensation, 6 concluding that fears of arbitrary governmental
action and discrimination were at the source of the prohibition.37
Discrimination is of course prohibited by the due process and
equal protection guarantees of the fourteenth amendment.38
31. See cases cited in note 49 infra and text accompanying notes
36-49 infra.
32. See cases cited in notes 34, 49 infra.
33. See generally note 62 infra and accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Parsippany-
Troy Hills Tp., 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963).
35. See note 4 supra.
36. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
See also Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J.
149 (1971).
37. Id. at 57. In discussing the compensation provision of the
fifth amendment of the United States Constitution, Sax noted that
"the English and American authorities writing at about the time of the
adoption of the fifth amendment also viewed the provision as a bul-
wark against unfairness, rather than against mere value diminution."
38. The fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution
states that "[n]o state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." In the words of the Supreme Court,
"Our whole system of law is predicated on the general, fundamental
principle of equality of application of the law. 'All men are equal be-
fore the law'. . ." Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332 (1921). Subject
to natural imperfections in any system of classification, persons in like
circumstances must be treated alike. E.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886); Anderson v. Forest Park, 239 F. Supp. 576 (W.D. Okla.
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Open space regulations commonly allocate private lands to uses
traditionally provided by government through purchase after ne-
gotiation or exercise of the power of eminent domain. Examples
of such uses are floodwater storage areas, parks, recreation
areas, parking lots, and wildlife areas. A combination of severe
restrictions and the allocation of private lands to uses which are
customarily provided through public purchase presents partic-
ularly strong "taking" arguments.
Understandably courts have been sensitive where govern-
mental units pay in one situation and regulate without payment
in analogous situations. For example, in Plainfield v. Middlesex
Borough39 a New Jersey court invalidated an ordinance which
zoned land exclusively for school, park, or playground use be-
cause it found the plaintiffs could not use the property them-
selves and could sell it only to "the very party imposing the re-
strictions. ' 40 Similarly, in Greenhills Home Owners Corp. v. Vil-
lage of Greenhills,41 an Ohio court invalidated an attempt to re-
strict land to the "greenbelt" uses of public parks and play-
grounds, public recreation buildings, gardens, farms, nurseries,
public utilities, and bus passenger stations. Several courts have
invalidated attempts to zone private land for parking lot uses.' 2
In the most recent of the cases, Sanderson v. City of Willmar,'"
the Minnesota Supreme Court in 1968 invalidated an ordinance
which rezoned property from business and commercial use to au-
tomobile parking and required that the property owners extend
first right of purchase to the city. The restriction was invali-
dated since the "city can, of course, acquire the property for pub-
lic parking by condemnation proceedings. ' 44 Several cases have
also invalidated on similar grounds attempts to hold lands open
to preserve flood storage. 45
1965): Executive Television Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of App., 138 Conn.
452, 85 A.2d 904 (1952); Ronda Realty Corp. v. Lawton, 414 Ill. 313,
111 N.E.2d 310 (1953).
39. 69 N.J. Super. 136, 173 A.2d 785 (L. Div. 1961).
40. Id. at 142, 173 A.2d at 788.
41. 202 N.E.2d 192 (Ohio Ct. App. 1964), rev'd, 5 Ohio St. 2d 207,
215 N.E.2d 403 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1967).
42. See Sanderson v. City of Willmar, 282 Minn. 1, 162 N.W.2d 494
(1968); Vernon Park Realty v. Mount Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, 121 N.E.2d
517 (1954). Cf. New Orleans v. Leeco, Inc., 226 La. 335, 76 So. 2d
387 (1954) (compelling parking lot for landowner's own activities). See
Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58 COLUM. L.
REv. 650, 666-67 & nn. 34-45 (1958).
43. 282 Minn. 1, 162 N.W.2d 494 (1968).
44. Id. at 7, 162 N.W.2d at 498.
45. The Kentucky Court of Appeals in Hager v. Louisville and Jef-
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The question of equal protection will continue to grow in
importance in judicial attempts to distinguish valid regulation
from invalid. taking. In many states, both regulations and scenic
or conservation easements are being used to preserve scenic and
ferson County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 261 S.W.2d 610 (Ky. CL
App. 1953), held that the Planning Commission's zoning resolution,
which would ultimately have the effect of incorporating private prop-
erty into ponding areas in accordance with a flood control plan for the
protection of the city and county, was unconstitutional because it took
property for public use without compensation.
In what may be considered a leading case dealing with zoning to
preserve open space, wildlife areas, and flood storage, the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Parsippany-
Troy Hills Tp., 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963), invalidated a "con-
servancy" zone which prohibited practically all development, including
filling, in part to preserve a naturally marshy area as a water de-
tention basin in aid of flood control. The court stated:
It is equally obvious from the proofs, and legally of the
highest significance, that the main purpose of enacting regula-
tions with the practical effect of retaining the meadows in
their natural state was for a public benefit. This benefit is
twofold . . .: first, use of the area as a water detention basin
in aid of flood control in the lower reaches of the Passaic Valley
... and second, preservation of the land as open space for the
benefits which would accrue to the local public from an un-
developed use....
Id. at 553, 193 A.2d at 240 (emphasis added).
The court noted and apparently accepted testimony
that the ordinance provisions were soundly conceived from the
scientific standpoint to accomplish this flood alleviation pur-
pose. He [Chief Engineer and Acting Director of the Division
of Water Policy and Supply of the State Department of Conser-
vation and Economic Development] said that artificial filling of
natural retention storage areas automatically increases the
magnitude and volume of flood downstream and that limiting
excavation to the area would result in retention of the capacity
for natural storage.
Id. (emphasis added).
Turning specifically to the taking question, the court, in a sweeping
statement, held:
While the issue of regulation as against taking is always
a matter of degree, there can be no question but that the linehas been crossed where the purpose and practical effect of the
regulation is to appropriate private property for a flood water
detention basin or open space. These are laudable public pur-
poses and we do not doubt the high-mindedness of their mo-
tivation. But such factors cannot cure basic unconstitutionality.
Id. at 555, 193 A.2d at 241 (emphasis added).
However, the court made it clear that the case did not remove flood
hazard regulations on the lower reaches of a river and were not en-
croachment regulations:
There is no substantial evidence in this case that the mat-
ter of intra-municipal flood control had any bearing on the
adoption of the . . . regulations. It does not appear that the
rise in the water level in the meadows in times of heavy
rainfall affected any other area in the township. The emphasis
was on permitting that rise within the area as a detention basin
for the benefit of lower valley sections rather than on any effort
1972]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
wildlife areas.4 6 For example, the Wisconsin Highway Depart-
ment had by July 1967 acquired 601 parcels of scenic easements
covering 6,223 acres of land along the Great River Road which
parallels the Mississippi River.47 The easements restrict lands to
residential, agricultural, or forestry use, prohibit new signs and
require the removal of existing ones, limit the density of develop-
ment, control tree cutting, and proscribe public entry onto lands.
The degree of restriction is no greater than that of some zoning
regulations. These essentially negative easements designed to
protect the natural view from the highway were held in Kama-
to prevent or channel it. This case, therefore, does not involve
the matter of police power regulation of the use of land in a
flood plain on the lower reaches of a river by zoning, building
restrictions, channel encroachment lines or otherwise and noth-
ing said in this opinion is intended to pass upon the validity of
any such regulations.
Id. at 556, 193 A.2d at 242, n.3 (emphasis added).
Consistent with Parsippany is Baker v. Planning Board, 353 Mass.
141, 228 N.E.2d 831 (1967), in which the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts held that a town could not disapprove a subdivision plan
on the ground that it would be in the best interest of the town to main-
tain the private land as a water storage area. A drainage ditch
crossed the land in the proposed subdivision. After heavy rainstorms
and thaws the land became flooded on both sides of the ditch and the
land consequently served as "a flood control or 'retention area' for the
town, to the extent of 16,200 cubic feet of water .... ." Id. at 143, 228
N.E.2d at 832.
The planning board had refused the subdivision plan for reasons
relating to the sewerage and water drainage. The sewerage system
proposed in the plan would have required the town to construct a lift
or pumping station, and the proposed water drainage system, as the
court noted, "although adequate for the subdivision, would deprive the
town of the retention area on Baker's land and, in consequence, would
overtax the downstream draining system outside the subdivision." Id.,
228 N.E.2d at 833. The board disapproved on the additional ground that
approval would not be in the best interest of the town, since it would
negate the purposes of MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 41, § 81(M) (Supp. 1971)
(Subdivision Control Law) with special reference to "securing safety in
the cases of ... flood, . . . securing adequate provision for water, sew-
erage, drainage and other requirements where necessary in a subdivi-
sion." Id.
The Baker court held that it was beyond the planning board's au-
thority to disapprove the plan for such a reason and noted:
Obviously a planning board may not exercise its authority to
disapprove a plan so that a town may continue to use the own-
er's land as a water storage area and thereby deprive the owner
of reasonable use of it.
353 Mass. at 145, 228 N.E.2d at 833.
46. See articles cited in note 280 infra.
47. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, STATE OF WISCONSIN, Special
Report No. 5, A MARKET STUDY OF PROPERTIES COVERED BY SCENIC EASE-
MENTS ALONG THE GREAT RIVER ROAD IN VERNON AND PIERCE COUNTIES
1 (October, 1967).
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rowski v. State4" to involve sufficient public use of lands to jus-
tify exercise of eminent domain powers. In light of these "scenic
easements" which compensate for control of development, use of
uncompensated regulation in similar circumstances to protect
scenery is discriminatory and subject to attack as an unconstitu-
tional "taking."49
Although the Supreme Court has made it clear that the role
of the legislature is broad in defining the scope of police power
objectives,50 regulations are occasionally invalidated as not serv-
ing valid objectives.5 1 Until recently land use controls directed
primarily at aesthetic protection have commonly been invali-
dated. 52 Many open space zoning cases in which courts have de-
tected improper objectives involve attempts to allocate lands for
public uses or to uses which are usually provided through public
purchase such as parking lots and flood storage and wildlife
areas.53 Attempts to zone to reduce property values for future
condemnation have also been held invalid.5 4 But official map-
ping55 which prohibits structures in the beds of future streets in
order to reduce the cost of future land acquisition has been up-
held.56 The willingness of courts to uphold official mapping of
48. 31 Wis. 2d 256, 142 N.W.2d 793 (1966).
49. In State v. Becker, 215 Wis. 564, 255 N.W. 144 (1934), a some-
what analogous case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that special
hunting restrictions imposed on private property to create a game refuge
was a "taking" of private property since establishment of a wildlife
territory was putting land to a public use. Game refuges were ordi-
narily created through the exercise of eminent domain powers. See
also State v. Herwig, 17 Wis. 2d 442, 117 N.W.2d 335 (1962).
50. E.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
51. See cases cited in notes 52, 54, 99 infra.
52. See, e.g., Barney & Carey Co. v. Milton, 324 Mass. 440, 87
N.E.2d 9 (1949); Cooper Lumber Co. v. Dammers, 2 N.J. Misc. 289, 125
A. 325 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
53. See, e.g., Sanderson v. City of Willmar, 282 Minn. 1, 162 N.W.2d
494 (1968) (parking lot purposes); Morris County Land Impr. Co. v.
Parsippany-Troy Hill Tp., 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963) (flood stor-
age, open space, wildlife purposes); City of Plainfield v. Borough of
Middlesex, 69 N.J. Super. 136, 173 A.2d 785 (L. Div. 1961) (school, park
or playground use); Vernon Park Realty v. Mount Vernon, 307 N.Y.
493, 121 N.E.2d 517 (1954) (parking lot purposes); Greenhills Home
Owners Corp. v. Village of Greenhills, 202 N.E.2d 192 (Ohio C. App.
1964), rev'd, 5 Ohio St. 2d 207, 215 N.E.2d 403 (1965), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 836 (1967) (greenbelt and park purposes).
54. See 1 R. ANDERsON, AzncAc LAW OF ZONI G, § 7.32 at 556
et seq. (1968) [hereinafter cited as ANDERSON]. See Long v. Highland
Park 329 Mich. 146, 45 N.W.2d 10 (1950) and cases cited in notes 199, 262
infra.
55. See generally Kueirck & Beuscher, Wisconsin's Official Map
Law, 1957 Wis. L. REv. 176 and note 197 infra.
56. See, e.g., cases cited in note 198 infra.
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roads but not zoning to achieve similar open space objectives
may be explained in part by the variance provisions of official
mapping laws which permit landowners to petition boards of ad-
justment for building permits if reasonable rates of return can-
not be earned on lands absent construction.G7  Unquestionably
the fact that official mapping of roads often precludes building
construction only on a narrow portion of each lot while zoning
of broader areas is likely to prevent construction on whole prop-
erties is important.58
Commentators have suggested that valid regulations can be
distinguished from invalid regulations through a functional de-
scription of the benefit conferred by the regulations. 0 It has
been argued that a taking occurs when a public benefit is pro-
vided at private expense, but not when the public requires only
that a private citizen "stop making a nuisance of himself."00 Yet
this test is difficult to apply to specific facts. Consider attempts
to stringently regulate the development of lands which serve as
natural flood storage areas. 1 The use of the police power here
is in a "twilight" zone where the regulations can be considered
as either preventing the landowner from harming the public or
requiring the landowner to bestow an uncompensated benefit
upon the public. While the filling of natural storage areas may
increase flood heights on other lands and therefore result in cer-
tain nuisance-like effects, regulations which prevent such filling
require one owner to maintain his land as a storage area to bene-
fit other owners and the public. Thus far attempts to prohibit
land development to preserve storage areas have been invali-
dated. A somewhat analogous situation is the regulation of lands
to preserve scenic beauty. Although development of lands may
destroy the view from the public waters, neighboring lands, or a
nearby highway, regulation precluding such development re-
quires the landowner to bestow an uncompensated benefit upon
the public and his neighbors.
In drafting local open space regulations planners and attor-
neys would do well to avoid regulation or allocation of lands for
public uses such as public parks or express zoning to hold land
57. See note 229 infra.
58. See generally discussion accompanying notes 193-224 infra.
59. See Mfichelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on
the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REV.
1165, 1196 (1967). See also Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for
City Planning, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 650, 663-69 (1958).
60. Michelman, supra note 59, at 1196.
61. See cases cited in note 45 supra.
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open for future condemnation. But in view of the Supreme
Court's recognition of broad legislative discretion in the selection
of regulatory objectives, it seems likely that state courts will in-
creasingly examine regulations not so much in terms of the valid-
ity of the objectives as in terms of whether the regulatory means
chosen to implement the objectives are discriminatory, unrea-
sonable, or unduly affect the usability of lands.
Regulations are most commonly attacked on the ground that
they are. "unreasonable." Although this term is often used to
assert that the regulations contravene requirements of due proc-
ess, equal protection, or "taking without compensation," it most
properly connotes the argument that regulations (the means)
do not promote the regulatory objectives (the ends).62
62. It is well established by the courts that a regulation will be
declared arbitrary and unconstitutional unless the regulation (the
means) is reasonably related to the accomplishment of the regulatory
objectives (the ends). A clear statement of this requirement may be
found in Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 105 (1909), in which the United
States Supreme Court stated the applicable principles:
The statutes have been passed under the exercise of so-
called police power, and they must have some fair tendency to
accomplish, or aid in the accomplishment of some purpose, for
which the legislature may use the power. If the statutes are
not of that kind, then their passage cannot be justified under
that power. These principles have been so frequently decided
as not to require the citation of many authorities. If the means
employed, pursuant to the statute, have no real, substantial re-
lation to a public object which government can accomplish; if
the statutes are arbitrary and unreasonable and beyond the
necessities of the case; the courts will declare their invalidity.(emphasis added)
Generally the role of the courts is small in determining the rea-
sonableness of regulations. See, e.g., Stephenson v. Bruford 287 U.S.
251, 272 (1932). However, successful attacks on zoning ordinances
are commonly based upon the claim that regulations are not reason-
ably related to the regulatory objectives. See, e.g., Tews v. Woolhiser,
352 Ill. 212, 185 N.E. 827 (1933); Pleasant Ridge v. Cooper, 267 Mch.
603, 255 N.W. 371 (1934). The Supreme Court in Nectow v. Cambridge,
277 U.S. 183 (1928), the last major zoning decision of that court, held
unconstitutional a residential zoning classification as applied to a par-
ticular parcel of land. The Court noted that the land was not suited for
residences and was of "comparatively little value for the limited uses
permitted by the ordinance." The Court further stated:
The governmental power to interfere by zoning regulations
with the general rights of the land owner by restricting the
character of his use, is not unlimited, and other questions aside,
such restriction cannot be imposed if it does not bear a sub-
stantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare.
Id. at 188. The Court found
[tlhat the invasion of the property... was serious and highly
injurious ... and, since a necessary basis for the support of
that invasion is wanting, the action of the zoning authorities
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For example, in La Salle National Bank v. Highland Park,08
the Illinois Supreme Court rejected arguments that three acre
minimum lot sizes were needed to preserve the amount of earth
available to absorb flood waters and prevent increases in the rate
of runoff. Although small lot sizes would increase runoff to
some degree in normal rainfall, they would be of minor signifi-
cance when the land was "drenched by flood producing down-
pours and, moreover, plaintiff's land would contribute but an in-
significant amount of the total waters in the ditch, no matter
which zoning prevails. ' 64  The court held that the requirement
was not necessary to lessen or avoid flood conditions and that
"its application to plaintiff's land is arbitrary and confiscatory
without substantial public benefit or purpose."63 The degree of
restriction on the use of land and diminution in property values
will determine the scope of examination. The Connecticut Su-
preme Court has noted that where property value is seriously
diminished by a zoning regulation there is a judicial obligation
"carefully to consider . . . whether the regulation does in fact
tend to serve the public welfare and the recognized purposes
of zoning."66
III. FACTORS RELEVANT TO THE QUESTION
OF TAKING
The typical judicial test balances the harm posed to society
by uncontrolled land use against the impact of the regulations
upon the usability of the parcel: 07 "If the gain to the public
by the ordinance is small when compared with the hardship im-
posed upon the individual property owner by the restrictions of
the ordinance, no valid basis for the exercise of the police power
exists." 68 Those factors relevant to the question of whether the
comes within the ban of the Fourteenth Amendment and
cannot be sustained.
Id. at 188-89.
63. 27 Ill. 2d 350, 189 N.E.2d 302 (1963).
64. Id. at 354, 189 N.E.2d at 305.
65. Id.
66. Strain v. Mims, 123 Conn. 275, 286, 193 A. 754, 759 (1937).
67. 1 ANDERSON, § 2.19, at 80-81 states:
Many of the constitutional cases reflect an earnest judicial
attempt to weigh and balance the private and public interests
which are involved in every zoning case. The courts appear to
balance the public benefit which the regulation is intended to
confer, against the economic impact of the regulation upon the
land of the complaining litigant .... This accommodation of
public and private interests is implicit in many of the decisions,
but some courts have articulated it.
68. Town of Caledonia v. Racine Limestone, 266 Wis. 475, 479, 63
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particular zoning classification is reasonably related to the ac-
complishment of community objectives are also relevant to the
question of whether the particular regulation is so restrictive
that a "taking" or "confiscation" may be said to have occurred. 9
A. PuiIc H
1. Protection of Public Safety
In the balancing of public needs and private detriment,
courts have not given equal weight to accomplishment of all
regulatory objectives. Courts have sanctioned the use of the
police power to prohibit the use of private property or the de-
struction of it without compensation where that use threatens
public health, safety, or morals. Regulations preserving public
safety are afforded a special presumption of constitutionality.70
Since protection of the public health and safety, which is the un-
derlying objective of most criminal, traffic, and food and drug
laws, is considered a primary and essential function of govern-
ment, regulations which are reasonably related to that objective
are almost invariably sustained. In fact, it has long been estab-
lished that, subject to later judicial review, the state may sum-
marily seize and destroy private property which may be dis-
tributed to the injury of the public or for illegal purposes.7 1
Examples include diseased cattle, contaminated food, obscene
publications, illicit intoxicants, narcotics, prohibited weapons,
N.W.2d 697, 699 (1954). See also Miller Bros. Lumber Co. v. Chicago,
41411. 162, 111 N.E.2d 149 (1953).
69. In La Salle Nat'1 Bank v. Cook County, 60 IM. App. 2d 39, 51,
208 N.E.2d 430, 436 (1965), the court enumerated some of the factors
which are to be taken into account:
(1) existing uses and zoning of nearby property;
(2) the extent to which property values are diminished by the
particular zoning restrictions;
(3) the extent to which the restriction of property values
of the plaintiffs promotes the health, safety, morals or
general welfare of the public;
(4) the relative gain to the public, as compared to the hard-
ship imposed upon the individual property owner;(5) the suitability of the subject property for the zoned pur-
poses; and(6) the length of time the property has been vacant as zoned,
considered in the context of land development in the area
in the vicinity of the property. (emphasis added)
These factors are cited in 1 AiwRasoT, § 2.19, at 83.
70. See generally Cleaners Guild v. Chicago, 312 IIl. App. 102, 37
N.E.2d 857 (1941).
71. See State Plant Bd. v. Smith, 110 So. 2d 401 (Fla. Sup. Ct.
1959).
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gambling devices, "and other property that menaces the public
health, safety or morals. '72 Cases sustain police power regula-
tions ordering the uncompensated destruction of diseased trees,73
animals,7 4 and crops. 75 The Supreme Court, in Denver & Rio
Grande R.R. Co. v. City of Denver70 upheld the constitution-
ality of an ordinance which required the removal of railroad
track from a busy intersection of two streets in Denver. Al-
though the railroad had a contract to construct the tracks and
the right granted was a vested property right,77 the Court none-
theless held the ordinance constitutional because the power to
adopt and enforce regulations was reasonably necessary to pro-
tect public safety,78 and "'is inalienable even by express grant'
and its legitimate exertion contravenes neither the contract
clause of the Constitution nor the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. ' 79
Specific provisions in open space regulations which prohibit
or severely restrict uses posing threats to public safety are likely
to be upheld. These may include regulations of industrial uses
which cause air or water pollution; of domestic waste disposal
systems which may cause water pollution; of dikes, dams, or
levees which may burst in time of flood; and of the storage of
explosive materials in flood plain areas. However, open space
regulations which prohibit or regulate uses which do not pose
substantial threats to public safety, such as residential use, will
encounter greater judicial resistance.
2. Prevention of Nuisances
The prohibition or destruction of nuisances or nuisance-
like uses which threaten the health, safety, or welfare of a broad
segment of society, as well as those which may have substantial
detrimental effects on a neighborhood or neighboring lands have
generally been sustained.
72. Id. at 408.
73. See, e.g., State v. Main, 69 Conn. 123, 37 A. 80 (1897); State
Plant Bd. v. Smith, 110 So. 2d 401 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1959); Balch v. Glenn,
85 Kan. 735, 119 P. 67 (1911); Louisiana State Bd. of A. & I. v. Tanz-
mann, 140 La. 756, 73 So. 854 (1917).
74. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 240 Ind. 230, 163 N.E.2d 605 (1960),
and cases cited therein.
75. See, e.g., Van Gunten v. Worthley, 25 Ohio App. 496, 159 N.E.
326 (1927); Wallace v. Feehan, 206 Ind. 522, 190 N.E. 438 (1934); Wal-
lace v. Dohner, 89 Ind. App. 416, 165 N.E. 552 (1929).
76. 250 U.S. 241 (1919).
77. Id. at 244.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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In a 1916 case, Northeast Laundry v. City of Des Moines,80
the Supreme Court sustained an ordinance which declared the
emission of dense smoke in sections of a city to be a nuisance
and prohibited uses which might cause it. While emissions of
smoke may affect large areas, other cases have sustained pro-
hibition of uses with less widespread effects. In 1915 in Hada-
check v. Los Angeles,8 1 the Supreme Court sustained a city ordi-
nance which proscribed the use of brick kilns in a residential
neighborhood, thereby reducing the value of a tract on which
the kilns stood from $800,000 to $60,000. There was evidence that
emissions from petitioner's brickmaking factory had caused sick-
ness to those living in the surrounding area.82 In another 1915
case, Reinman v. Little Rock,83 the Supreme Court sustained an
ordinance which prohibited livery stables in shopping areas al-
though the livery stable was not a "nuisance per se" at common
law; and in a 1919 case, Pierce Oil Corp. v. City of New York,8 4
the Supreme Court sustained an ordinance which prohibited
the storing of oil and gasoline within 300 feet of a dwelling.
It is interesting that in each of these four early cases involv-
ing a laundry, a brickyard, a livery stable, and oil tanks, the uses
had been lawful when the affected buildings were constructed.
Changed conditions resulting from growth of the cities placed
the uses in conflict with new neighbors. In sustaining the use of
police powers to minimize conflicts between neighboring uses of
property, the Court recognized an extension of the common law
doctrine of nuisance.
Prohibitions against nuisance-like uses place a financial
burden on the owner of the prohibited brickyard, livery stable,
or oil tanks. But at least in theory he is able to use his land for a
variety of purposes not inconsistent with the public welfare or
neighboring uses. The regulations will impose a degree of re-
striction on his lands no greater than that on similarly situated
surrounding lands which are occupied by the incompatible uses.
The landowner is denied the use of his land for the nuisance-like
use, but he may retain a large number of practical uses or uses
like those on nearby properties. In addition, the landowner en-
joys a reciprocal benefit from the restrictions which prohibit oth-
ers from creating nuisances. In contrast, open space zones are
often designed to preserve scenic beauty or a wildlife area for the
80. 239 U.S. 486 (1916).
81. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
82. Id. at 408.
83. 237 U.S. 171 (1915).
84. 248 U.S. 498 (1919).
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benefit of neighboring developed private or public lands. This
results in more stringent restriction of the affected parcels than
neighboring lands. Further, it is questionable whether the se-
verely regulated landowner desires a reciprocal benefit from the
restrictions, since a landowner is hardly benefited by restric-
tions if he is prevented from making any economic use of his
land. Restrictions have occasionally been invalidated where
there was no reciprocity in the benefits and burdens of the regu-
lations.8 5
85. In evaluating the reasonableness of land use regulations, courts
occasionally suggest that there must be reciprocity of benefits and bur-
dens among landowners. This may be true even though one of the
landowners is a governmental unit, since regulations cannot restrict one
class to benefit another. In Dooley v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n,
151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770 (1964), the Connecticut Supreme Court
struck down as confiscatory a flood plain zoning ordinance severely lim-
iting land uses, apparently in order to preserve the flood plain in a
natural state. Although there was no evidence to suggest that the land
was regulated to confer a positive benefit on the community, the court
stressed the lack of benefit to the landowner of such a classification.
The court proposed the following test:
Where most of the value of a person's property has to be
sacrificed so that community welfare may be served, and
where the owner does not directly benefit from the evil
avoided ... the occasion is appropriate for the exercise of
eminent domain. (emphasis supplied)
Id. at 312, 197 A.2d at 774.
The reciprocity of benefits approach is taken in several early Wis-
consin cases. In Piper v. Ekern, 180 Wis. 586, 194 N.W. 159 (1923), the
Wisconsin court invalidated a statute which prohibited buildings ex-
ceeding 90 feet in height around Madison's Capital Square. The plain-
tiffs wished to construct a hotel in excess of the permissible height and
claimed a loss on the value of the real estate in the sum of $50,000 and
an annual loss in the income of $35,000. Although the court cited cases
upholding the general principle of limiting height of buildings, it ex-
plained those cases in the following manner:
Such regulation affecting the owners of property in a certain
area, to a large extent is founded upon the mutual and reciprocal
protection which owners of property derive from a general law,
and while in a sense a material diminution in value may re-
sult, nevertheless a reciprocal advantage accrues which in many
instances it is impossible to estimate from a financial stand-
point, but which nevertheless constitutes a thing of value and a
compensating factor for the interference by the public with
property rights.
180 Wis. at 591, 194 N.W. at 161 (emphasis added).
The court found that the act was not designed to promote the
public welfare of the property owners abutting upon the Capital Square,
but for the protection of state property from fire. The court stated that
the act was "designed solely for the protection of the Capitol build-
ing," and not to achieve reciprocal benefit and protection of owners of
buildings within the area. Id. at 599, 194 N.W. at 164.
A later statute (Wis. Laws 1923, ch. 424) which limited the height
of all buildings in first class cities to 125 feet and to 100 feet in other
cities was upheld by the Wisconsin court in the Building Height Cases,
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Moreover, unsightliness does not constitute a nuisance. Pro-
181 Wis. 519, 195 N.W. 544 (1923), without discussion of the reciprocity
problem. The court in a later case, State ex rel. Ekern v. Milwaukee,
190 Wis. 633, 209 N.W. 860 (1926), held that limitation of the maxi-
mum height of buildings in a city was a local affair within the legisla-
tive power granted to cities by sec. 3, art. XI, of the Wisconsin Consti-
tution, as amended. While the rigid "reciprocity" test raised by the
court in Piper would not likely be used today, a similar focus upon ben-
efits and burdens seems likely for regulations which severely limit
land uses such as flood plain zones, open space zones, scenic protection
zones, and the like.
Several cases have considered arguments that regulations restrict-
ing development benefit the private landowners by providing a more
pleasing environment. In Simon v. Town of Needham, 311 Mass. 560,
42 N.E.2d 516 (1942), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts up-
held a zoning ordinance which required one acre minimum lot sizes
in a residential suburb of Boston. The countryside consisted of unde-
veloped woodland, tillage, swampland and lakes and streams. The
court pointed out the advantages of large lot sizes to both the general
public and the regulated landowners:
The advantages enjoyed by those living in one family dwell-
ings located upon an acre lot might be thought to exceed those
possessed by persons living upon a lot of ten thousand square
feet. More freedom from noise and traffic might result. The
danger from fire from outside sources might be reduced. A
better opportunity for rest and relaxation might be afforded.
Greater facilities for children to play on the premises and not in
the streets would be available. There may perhaps be more
inducement for one to attempt something in the way of the cul-
tivation of flowers, shrubs and vegetables. There may be other
advantages accruing to the occupants of the larger lots. The
benefits derived by those living in such a neighborhood must
be considered with the benefit that would accrue to the public
generally who resided in Needham by the presence of such a
neighborhood.
Id. at 563-64, 42 N.E.2d at 518 (emphasis added).
In a second case, Aronson v. Town of Sharon, 346 Mass. 598, 195
N.E.2d 341 (1964), the Massachusetts court cited and distinguished Need-
ham. The case involved a zoning ordinance classifying an area for sin-
gle family use on lots containing 100,000 square feet and having a width
of not less than 200 feet. The town of Sharon was a rural area with a
large lake near the center. The land to which the disputed residen-
tial district applied consisted of a mixture of loam, glacial hills and
swampy areas. Since the area was somewhat separated from the rest
of the town by lack of adequate transportation facilities, the town con-
sidered the situation "as creating an opportunity to cause the land in
this area to be kept open and used for conservation purposes." Id.
at 601, 195 N.E.2d at 343. A proposed plan outlined a two-fold program
maintaining the land at as low residential density as possible, and es-
tablishing a positive program of land acquisition. The court quoted
extensively from Needham but distinguished the case and rejected the
town's arguments that:
The physical characteristics of the district, considered in con-junction with those of the town, a town of residences, large
camps, a retreat house, fish and game clubs, a wildlife sanctu-
ary, and large recreation and conservation areas, indicate that
all that has made Sharon beautiful... will best be maintained
by the lot size requirements of its zoning by-law. The zoning
here in question will encourage leaving land in the natural
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hibited nuisance 6 uses often interfere in a physical sense with
state, which will provide the inhabitants, and those who come
to Sharon, with a community which has the living and recrea-
tional amenities that are fundamental to mental and physical
health.
Id. at 603-04, 195 N.E.2d at 345.
The language of the court in distinguishing Needham is particularly
interesting since it might indicate the approach of a court considering
shoreland regulations which restricted private property to benefit both
the private land and the general welfare. The court held that a
point of diminishing return to the landowner is reached with regula-
tions which restrict private land uses to preserve amenity:
In Simon v. Needham . . . are enumerated certain possible
advantages of living upon an acre lot as compared with one
of 10,000 square feet. While initially an increase in lot size
might have the effects there noted, the law of diminishing re-
turns will set in at some point. As applied to the petitioner's
property, the attainment of such advantages does not reasonably
require lots of 100,000 square feet. Nor would they be attained
by keeping the rural district undeveloped, even though this
might contribute to the welfare of each inhabitant. Granting
the value of recreational areas to the community as a whole, the
burden of providing them should not be borne by the in-
dividual property owner unless he is compensated.
Id. at 604, 195 N.E.2d at 345 (emphasis added, citation omitted). Similar
arguments might be made that the open space restrictions control de-
velopment not to bestow reciprocal benefits upon land-owners, but
to bestow a benefit upon the public.
While a showing of reciprocity of benefits may not now be essen-
tial to establish validity of restrictions, such reciprocity will add
weight to arguments for sustaining severe restrictions. The owner of
open space property may, if he is able to make some practical use of
his land, be benefited in a variety of ways by high quality adjacent
waters and lands. The waters may be scenic and can be used for swim-
ming, boating, and fishing. Beautiful and spacious adjacent shoreland
property maintains the attractiveness and value of all property in the
area.
The basic concept of nuisance law-that a landowner should not
by his own land use impose burdens upon adjacent lands or the com-
munity-has been expanded and applied in new contexts. For example,
courts evaluating the validity of conditions imposed upon subdivision
plot approval such as construction of roads, installation of sewer and
water, or provision of parks have generally supported subdivision re-
quirements only if they are designed to reduce burdens specifically at-
tributable to the subdivision. The Illinois Supreme Court in Pioneer
Trust & Say. Bk. v. Village of Mt. Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 380, 176
N.E.2d 799, 802 (1961), stated:
If the requirement is within the statutory grant of power to
the municipality and if the burden cast upon the subdivider is
specifically and uniquely attributable to his activity, then the
requirement is permissible; if not, it is forbidden and amounts
to a confiscation of private property in contravention of the con-
stitutional prohibitions rather than reasonable regulation under
the police power.
See Jordan v. Menominee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 617, 137 N.W.2d 442, 447
(1965), which quoted this language with approval. See also Johnson,
Constitutionality of Subdivision Control Exactions: The Quest for a
Rationale, 52 CORNELL L. Q. 871 (1967).
86. Whether a use was or was not a common law nuisance de-
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public health or nearby properties by the creation of noise, dust,
odor, glare, heat, and so forth. Courts have often sanctioned
regulations designed to prevent these common-law nuisances.
As stated by the California Supreme Court: "The primary pur-
pose of comprehensive zoning is to protect others, and the gen-
eral public, from uses of property which will, if permitted, prove
injurious to them."8 7 In Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,88 the land-
mark case in which the Supreme Court approved comprehensive
zoning, the Court relied on the common law of nuisance as an
analogy for sustaining zoning.8 9 However, mere unsightliness of
premises was not considered a nuisance at common law even
though unsightliness might annoy a neighboring landowner and
detract from the value of his lands.9 0 It is to be noted that only
pended upon the (1) sort of interferences, W. PROssER, LAW OF Toirrs
583-86 (4th ed. 1971), (2) whether the interference resulted in sub-
stantial damage, id. at 577-80, (3) whether the interference and damages
were reasonable, considering the uses of surrounding land, id. at 580-82,
and (4) other circumstances. Industries which interfered with surround-
ing lands by unpleasant odors, smoke or dust or gas, loud noises, or
high temperatures were often considered nuisances. Id. at 584. See
generally cases cited therein. So were cases that resulted in physical
damage to nearby lands, such as vibration from blasting, destruction of
crops, flooding, or pollution of a stream. See, e.g., Johnson v. Fair-
mont, 188 Minn. 451, 247 N.W. 572 (1933).
87. Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515,
524, 370 P.2d 342, 348, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, 644 (1962).
88. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
89. Id. at 387-88. The Court stated:
In solving doubts [as to whether a zoning ordinance would be
valid in a particular circumstance], the maxim sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedus [use your own property in such a manner as
not to injure that of another], which lies at the foundation of
so much of the common law of nuisances, ordinarily wilt furnish
a fairly helpful clew. And the law of nuisances, likewise, may
be consulted, not for the purpose of controlling, but for the
helpful aid of its analogies in the process of ascertaining the
scope of, the power. Thus the question whether the power ex-
ists to forbid the erection of a building of a particular kind or
for a particular use, like the question whether a particular thing
is a nuisance, is to be determined, not by an abstract considera-
tion of the building or of the thing considered apart, but by
considering it in connection with the circumstances and the
locality.... A nuisance may be merely a right thing in the
wrong place, -like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard.
If the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes
be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed
to control. (emphasis added and citation omitted)
90. See, e.g., Metzger v. Hochrein, 107 Wis. 267, 83 N.W. 308 (1900);
Livingston v. Davis, 243 Iowa 21, 50 N.W.2d 592 (1951). In many in-
stances the common law recognized as actionable nuisances only physi-
cal interferences with the use of adjacent lands. In Janesville v. Car-
penter, 77 Wis. 288, 297-98, 46 N.W. 128, 131 (1890) the court noted:
[T]here must be material annoyance, inconvenience, discom-
fort, or hurt, and the violation of another's rights in an essential
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a limited number of the usual land uses impose such direct and
substantial harm on neighboring lands or the community as to
constitute public or private nuisances. The long lines of private
and public nuisance cases sustaining regulation of activities
which cause substantial third party effects form a direct analogy
for regulating these "harmful" activities but not others. Rarely
would all structural uses which open space zoning proscribes be
nuisance-like. Residences located outside of flood hazard areas
and equipped with adequate onsite waste disposal systems might
detract from beauty but are not common-law nuisances.
The various theories which have been suggested to ex-
plain why prohibition or destruction of nuisance-like uses should
not result in a finding of a taking do not lend support to open
space zoning. One line of reasoning suggests that nuisance uses
are not in fact property9 ' and are therefore not subject to the
constitutional guarantees. Sax suggests a second reason-since
the governmental unit is acting in an arbitral capacity in regu-
lating nuisance uses and resolving land use conflicts between
property owners, the regulations are to be viewed as noncom-
pensable 9 2 He argues that when government is a party in a
land use conflict situation rather than an impartial observer
government should pay. In establishing open space regulations,
the governmental unit often is not merely intervening in a dis-
pute between private landowners, but rather is an active par-
ticipant. The government is hardly an arbitrator in establishing a
scenic view, for example.
degree. Wood, Nuis. 1, 3, 4. The law gives protection only
against substantial injury, and the injury must be tangible, or
the comfort, enjoyment, or use must be materially impaired.
(original emphasis)
91. Mr. Justice Harlan in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887)
used this analysis when he spoke for the Supreme Court in sustaining
the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting the manufacture of alco-
holic beverages. Such regulations had the effect of closing down a
brewery:
The exercise of the police power by the destruction of property
which is itself a public nuisance, or the prohibition of its use
in a particular way, whereby its value becomes depreciated, is
very different from taking property for public use, or from de-
priving a person of his property without due process of law.
In the one case, a nuisance only is abated; in the other, unof-
fending property is taken away from an innocent owner.
Id. at 669.
92. See Sax, Taking and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 63
(1964).
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3. Promotion of Aesthetics
Protection of aesthetic values alone has not been considered
a sufficient objective for regulation of private land uses,03 since
"[a] esthetic considerations are a matter of luxury and indul-
gence rather than of necessity, and it is necessity alone which
justifies the exercise of the police power . . . ., Two funda-
mental problems are presented by regulations enacted to achieve
aesthetic protection: (1) What is "beautiful"? and (2) What
weight should be given to amenity protection as a regulatory ob-
jective? Courts have most often expressed concern with the
first issue since beauty has been considered a subjective matter
incapable of precise definition and dictated by individual taste.9
Although the second problem has not been subject to extensive
discussion in the decisions, it is tacitly considered. For example,
in 1966 in Bismark v. Bayville,96 a lower New York court invali-
dated an amendment to a residential zoning ordinance which in-
creased lot sizes from 15,000 square feet to 40,000 square feet, par-
tially because the protection of aesthetic values was not felt to
justify the severe reduction in property values caused by the lot
size increase. The plaintiff owned an undeveloped and attrac-
tive parcel of shoreland property with 2,550 feet of frontage on
Long Island Sound. The court found that there was neither
need nor demand for 40,000 square foot lots in the area and that
nearby properties had been developed at much higher density.
93. See, e.g., Barney & Carey Co. v. Milton, 324 Mass. 440, 87
N.E.2d 9 (1949), and cases cited therein.
94. Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting Co., 72 N.J.L. 285, 287, 62 A.
267, 268 (1905).
95. An Ohio court in City of Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co.,
112 Ohio St 654, 661-62, 148 N.E. 842, 844 (1925), stated the problem:
[A]uthorities in general agree as to the essentials of a public
health program, while the public view as to what is necessary
for aesthetic progress greatly varies. Certain Legislatures
might consider that it was more important to cultivate a taste
for jazz than for Beethoven, for posters than for Rembrandt, and
for limericks than for Keats. Successive city councils might
never agree as to what the public needs from an aesthetic
standpoint, and this fact makes the aesthetic standard impracti-
cal as a standard for use restriction upon property. The world
would be at continual seesaw if aesthetic considerations were
permitted to govern the use of the police power.
Regulations to protect "natural" beauty seem to be less subject to
criticism as attempting to codify personal taste than regulations de-
signed to protect "beauty." "Natural" beauty might be said to refer
to the diverse elements in the natural landscape which combine to
produce a pleasing view. Of course, not all individuals believe the same
elements or combination of elements in the landscape are beautiful
96. 49 Misc. 2d 604, 267 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
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Considering the arguments of the village that aesthetics alone
could justify enactment of an ordinance, 97 it held that the ordi-
nance which reduced property values by 58 per cent to serve
aesthetic purposes deprived the owner of reasonable use of his
property 8 Other cases suggest that while protection of wild-
life may be a valid police power objective, regulations cannot
prevent all economic use of lands to serve this objective.09
B. PRIVATE PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT
In determining whether a taking has occurred, courts fo-
cus upon the effects of regulations in restricting the usability of
property. Several common queries include: (1) Has there been
a physical invasion of the land? (2) Are existing uses regulated;
and, if only future uses are regulated, for how long? (3) To
what extent do the regulations diminish the value of the land?
(4) Do the regulations prevent all reasonable use of the land?
1. Physical Invasion
Where there is a physical appropriation or invasion of land,
it is almost universally held that a taking occurs.'0 0 Physical
invasion of lands by a governmental unit not only precludes
many uses but violates the territorial sovereignty of private
property. If a governmental unit takes land for a road, hotel,
post office, or school it must pay for it. Courts have held that
a taking occurs where an irrigation channel is widened with re-
sulting destruction of private property.1 1 The Supreme Court
97. The village cited People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d
272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1963), appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963),
which gave limited endorsement to regulations adopted to protect aes-
thetic values. However, the regulations prevented only a few uses.
There was no evidence they reduced property values. The court ad-
mitted that " [c] ases may undoubtedly arise . . . in which the legislative
body goes too far in the name of aesthetics. . . ." Id. at 468, 191 N.E.2d
at 275, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 738.
98. The court held that "[c]learly the village did go too far in
violating plaintiff's rights in the name of aesthetics." 49 Misc. 2d 604,
267 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
99. See generally State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970);
Commissioner of Nat. Res. v. Volpe and Co., 349 Mass. 104, 206 N.E.2d
666 (1965) (remanded); MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals, 347 Mass. 690,
200 N.E.2d 254 (1964), 356 Mass. 635, 255 N.E.2d 347 (1970); Sibson v.
State, 110 N.H. 8, 259 A.2d 397 (1969); Morris County Land Imp. Co.
v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Tp., 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963).
100. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HRv. L. REv.
1165, 1184 (1967).
101. "[I]t should be obvious that the police power doctrine cannot
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has held that where land is flooded by a dam the landowner is
entitled to damages, 102 since "taking" includes invasions of prop-
erty which "effectually destroy or impair its usefulness ....
In Lorio v. Sea Isle City 10 4 the Army Corps of Engineers en-
tered onto private coastal land and constructed a large sand dune
for protection of the surrounding area against hurricane damage.
It was held that such uncompensated interference with the use
of private property to achieve a governmental objective was
unconstitutional. Similarly, decisions requiring that compensa-
tion be paid for damage due to aircraft noise recognize that
intense noise substantially interferes with most residential or
commercial uses, or agricultural uses involving the raising of
anhmals 05
A narrow limitation exists for destruction of property for
emergency protection of the public during fire, earthquake, or
war.106 And in at least several jurisdictions lands adjacent to
a navigable watercourse are subject to broad navigable servi-
tude.107 A governmental unit may even enter private land to
undertake channel maintenance or to build roads or levees.
There can be little argument with cases holding that public
flooding of lands, construction of dunes, and similar invasions
of land take property, since these uses substantially interfere
with private land uses. Although land values are not in all
be invoked in the taking ... of private property in the construction of a
public improvement.... To hold otherwise would in effect destroy the
protection guaranteed by our Constitution. .. ." Podesta v. Linden Irri-
gation Dist., 141 CaL. App. 2d 38, 51, 296 P.2d 401, 409 (1956). See also
Wolf v. Second Drainage Dist., 180 Kan. 312, 304 P.2d 473 (1956).
102. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 WaIL) 166.(1871).
103. Id. at 181.
104. 88 N.J. Super. 506, 212 A.2d 802 (L. Div. 1965).
105. See, e.g., Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962), and
discussion in Durham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective:
Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. CT. Rsv.
63.
106. See, e.g., United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952)
(destruction during war); Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16 (1880) (right
of state to destroy a building without compensation to prevent spread of
conflagration); Surocco v. Geary, 3 Cal. 69 (1853) (destruction of build-
ing to prevent the spread of a conflagration). See also Annot., 149
A.L.R. 1451 (1944).
107. Louisiana cases based upon a unique constitutional provision
are common: See, e.g., Jeanerette Lumber & Shingle Co. v. Board of
Comm'rs, 181 So. 2d 415 (La. Ct. App. 1965); Board of Comm'rs v.
Baron, 236 La. 846, 109 So. 2d 441 (1959); Delaune v. Board of Comm'rs,
230 La. 117, 87 So. 2d 749 (1956). For cases from another jurisdiction
see Andrews v. State, 19 Misc. 2d 217, 188 N.Y.S.2d 854 (Ct. Cl. 1959);
Bacorn v. State, 20 Misc, 2d 369, 195 NY.S.2d 214 (Ct. CL 1959),
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instances significantly reduced by governmental invasions, any
physical entry onto lands violates the primary and essential
attributes of sovereignty associated with private land ownership.
Decisions dealing with physical invasion of land are periph-
erally germane to some open space zoning objectives. The cases
suggest at a minimum that governmental attempts to permit
the public use of private lands for parks, parking lots, golf
courses and other areas without compensating the landowner
are likely to fail as unconstitutional takings. Attempts to re-
quire that private lands be held open for flood water storage may
be subject to similar objections particularly if the regulations pre-
vent all private economic uses.
2. Vested Rights and the Regulation Period
Since landowners are often considered to enjoy "vested"
rights in existing uses, regulations restricting future develop-
ments have an easier time than those affecting present uses.'0 8
While the Supreme Court' 09 and other courts1 0 have approved
attempts to abate existing uses of a noxious nature, attempts to
summarily abate existing uses through open space regulations
have not been well received by the courts or legal commenta-
tors."1  The duration of the restriction on future development
is also relevant to the question of taking.'1 2  While "interim"
regulations which freeze development for several years have
been sustained, 113 regulations which prohibit development of
108. See, e.g., Town of Hillsborough v. Smith, 276 N.C. 48, 170
S.E.2d 904 (1969); Gibson v. City of Oberlin, 171 Ohio St. 1, 167 N.E.2d
651 (1960).
109. E.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Reinman v.
Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915). The Court has also sustained regula-
tions requiring modification of existing structures. See, e.g., Queenside
Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80 (1946); Adamec v. Post, 273
N.Y. 250, 7 N.E.2d 120 (1937).
110. See generally Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 1134 (1968).
111. See generally, 1 ANDExsox § 6.64, at 445-46, § 6.06, at 319-23;
Katarincic, Elimination of Non-Conforming Uses, Buildings, and Struc-
tures by Amortization Concept Versus Law, 2 DUQUESNE U.L. REy. 1
(1963). However, courts have approved some "amortization" provi-
sions in zoning ordinances which require the termination of a non-
conforming use within a specified period of time. See, e.g., Los Ange-
les v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d 34 (1954); 1 ANDERSON,
§ 6.65, at 447-48, and cases cited therein.
112. See, e.g., Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222,
15 N.E.2d 587 (1938). The court held that the zoning ordinance in ques-
tion took private property because it prevented the reasonable or
profitable use of property at present or in the immediate future.
113. See, e.g., Fowler v. Obier, 224 Ky. 742, 7 S.W.2d 219 (1928);
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whole properties for long or indefinite periods have with little
exception been disapproved.1 1 4
3. Diminution in Value
Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the majority of the
Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,1 5 formu-
lated the classic "diminution" test for taking when he stated
that in determining the limits of the police power
[o]ne fact for consideration in determining such limits is the
extent of the diminution. When it reaches a certain magni-
tude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of
eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act So the
question depends upon the particular facts.1 10
The Supreme Court in a 1962 case, Goldbiatt v. Tonn of
Hempstead,117 upheld an ordinance which prohibited a long-term
practice of mining below the water table and imposed an affirma-
tive duty to refill mined areas. Although the record is unclear,
the land apparently had no reasonable use subject to such restric-
tions. The Court in dictum observed that "[t]here is no set
formula to determine where regulation ends and taking begins.
Although a comparison of values before and after is relevant...
it is by no means conclusive .... ,,11
Although widely cited, the diminution in value test has not
been satisfactory in determining if a taking has occurred. Ap-
parently no court has been bold enough to suggest a blanket rule
that a taking occurs where restrictions reduce values by 50, 75,
or 100 per cent. It is interesting to note, however, that in 50
cases collected as part of this study in which regulations were
found invalid as a taking and which contained a cost analysis,
the weighted mean reduction in value was 73 per cent."9 In
comparison, 50 cases validating regulations showed a weighted
mean reduction in value of 60 per cent.120 Landowners arguing
Campana v. Clark Tp., 82 N.J. Super. 392, 197 A.2d 711 (L. Div. 1964);
Walworth County v. Elkhorn, 27 Wis. 2d 30, 133 N.W.2d 257 (1965).
See also, Note, Stopgap Measures to Preserve the Status Quo Pending
Comprehensive Zoning or Urban Redevelopment Legislation, 14 CAsE W.
REs. L. flxv. 135 (1962).
114. See, e.g., Henle v. City of Euclid, 97 Ohio App. 258, 118 N.E.2d
682, 125 N.E.2d 355 (1954); Miller v. Beaver Falls, 368 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d
34 (1951).
115. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
116. Id. at 413.
117. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
118. Id. at 594.
119. See note 4 supra.
120. Id.
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that regulations take their land often enter court with detailed
cost analysis of the initial price of land, rent values, sale value of
their land before and after the restrictions, and taxes. Most
often they are successful in arguing that a taking has occurred
if they can show that the regulations prevent all reasonable use
of land. The effect of the diminution in value, not the amount,
seems to be the crucial factor even though the two are inter-
related.
It is interesting to note that occasionally the source of the
land value may be determinative in the decision whether a tak-
ing has occurred. A reduction in value argument is less likelv
to be accepted if a governmental activity or right contributes to
the initial property value. For example, in Kelbor v. Myrich12'
the Vermont Supreme Court upheld the regulation of signs on
the theory that display of signs along a public highway was not
a property right but a privilege. The court stressed that the
value of the property for sign-board use was derived in part be-
cause of the proximity of the property to the public thorough-
fare from which signs could be seen. The reasoning of the court
might be extended to common open space zoning which regulates
shoreland uses. Land values in shoreland areas arise in part
from their location adjacent to public waters. Therefore, a more
severe reduction in land values is justified in the case of shore-
land regulations which protect the view and quality of public
waters. 122 Of course distinctions do exist between highways and
navigable waters. Newly constructed highways benefit present
adjacent landowners by increasing land values. In contrast,
navigable lakes and streams have long been in existence. The
higher value of shoreland property due to the adjacent navigable
waters may have been reflected in the price paid by a present
owner to his predecessor. To some extent, however, the state
may continue to enhance shoreland property values by programs
such as wildlife management and fish-stocking which maintain
public waters.
121. 113 Vt. 64, 30 A.2d 527 (1943). See also New York State
Thruway Auth. v. Ashley Motor Ct., 10 N.Y.2d 151, 176 N.E.2d 566, 218
N.Y.S.2d 640 (1961); Perlmutter v. Greene, 259 N.Y. 327, 182 N.E. 5
(1932). See generally Williams, Legal Techniques to Protect and to
Promote Aesthetics Along Transportation Corridors, 17 BUFF. L. REv.
701 (1968).
122. See generally, David, The Exploding Demand for Recreational
Property, 45 LAND ECON. 206 (1968); Comment, Components of Rural
Land Values in Northern Wisconsin, 40 LAND ECON. 87 (1964).
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4. Denial of All Reasonable Use
A fourth formula, already mentioned and often articulated
in the cases, focuses specifically upon the effect of regulations
in preventing the economic use of private land. Where the
restrictions deny all "reasonable", "practical" or "beneficial" use
of the land the restrictions are unconstitutional.1 23  Generally
the test is invoked in instances where the zoning or other regu-
lations severely restrict the number and manner of uses. If the
land is physically but not economically suited for the permitted
uses, the landowner may have no practical use.
"Denial of reasonable use" has been interpreted to mean de-
nial of any profitable use rather than any possible use. Perhaps
the most often quoted language is found in Arverne Bay Con-
struction Co. v. Thatcher,124 in which the New York Court of
Appeals, in holding invalid a residential classification as applied
to a parcel of vacant land, noted that
the plaintiffs land cannot at present or in the immediate future
be profitably or reasonably used without violation of the re-
striction. An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use
of property that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose
goes, it is plain, beyond regulation, and must be recognized as
a taking of the property. 2 5
Concern with diminution in value often arises from the ques-
tion whether some practical use is possible for lands. Some
courts have interpreted the reasonable use test in strictly dollars
and cents terms. In Town of Hempstead v. Lynne,120 a New York
court held a residential zoning classification confiscatory and in-
valid because development as a residential area would have re-
123. See, e.g., Little Rock v. Hocott, 220 Ark. 421, 247 S.W.2d 1012
(1952); Corthouts v. Town of Newington, 140 Conn. 284, 99 A.2d 112
(1953); Hammond v. Carlyon, 96 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1957); Forde v.
Miami Beach, 146 Fla. 676, 1 So. 2d 642 (1941); Tews v. Woolhiser,
352 II. 212, 185 N.E. 827 (1933); Hamilton Co. v. Louisville & Jefferson
County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 287 S.W.2d 434 (Ky. 1956); Balti-
more v. Cohn, 204 Md. 523, 105 A.2d 482 (1954); Robyns v. Dearborn,
341 Mich. 495, 67 N.W.2d 718 (1954); Grand Trunk Western R. v. De-
troit, 326 Mich. 387, 40 N.W.2d 195 (1949); Oschin v. Township of Red-
ford, 315 Mich. 359, 24 N.W.2d 152 (1946); Pleasant Ridge v. Cooper,
267 Mich. 603, 255 N.W. 371 (1934); Morris County Land Imp. Co. v.
Parsippany-Troy Hills Tp., 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963); Summers v.
City of Glen Cove, 17 N.Y.2d 307, 217 N.E.2d 663, 270 N.Y.S.2d 611
(1966); Town of Hempstead v. Lynne, 32 Misc. 2d 312, 222 N.Y.S.2d
526 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Brockman v. Morr, 112 Ohio App. 445, 168 N.E.2d
892 (1960).
124. 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938).
125. Id. at 232, 15 N.E.2d at 592.
126. 32 Misc. 2d 312, 222 N.Y.S.2d 526 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
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sulted in over $90,000 loss of investment, thereby preventing
economic use. 12
7
Other decisions undertake a "denial of reasonable use" anal-
ysis without so clearly articulating that "reasonable use" means
an economic use. It is generally agreed that the landowner need
not be allowed to make the most profitable use of his land.1 28
And an otherwise valid regulation is not rendered unconstitu-
tional because it deprives property of its most beneficial use. 1 29
Three cases employing the test are of special import. In
Dooley v. Town Plan and Zoning Commission'3 ° the Connecti-
cut Supreme Court held invalid as "confiscatory" as applied to
plaintiffs' land a zoning amendment which reclassified the land
from residential to "flood plain district". The district included
land along a creek in Fairfield County, Connecticut, and was ap-
parently subject to both flooding by the creek and hurricane
flooding from Long Island Sound.131 The ordinance permitted
only open space uses 132 and provided that uses not specifically
listed were not permissible. 1 33  It further forbade the excava-
tion, filling and removal of soil, earth or gravel within the flood
plain district except as authorized by a special exception per-
mit, which was available only under stringent conditions and
127. The court stated:
The owner's right of user [sic] here is so limited by the re-
strictive ordinance that there is in reality an economic taking
of his property, even though he is left with title, possession
and a possibility of use for the restricted purpose. The
amendment is thus confiscatory in that it precludes the use of
the property for any purpose to which it is reasonably or
economically adapted.
Id. at 319-20, 222 N.Y.S.2d at 534 (original emphasis).
128. See generally 1 ANDERSON, § 2.21 at 85 et seq., and many cases
cited therein. See also § 2.23 at 101 et seq.
129. See Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Reinman v.
Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
130. 151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770 (1964).
131. Approximately 91 per cent of the district was at or below the
elevation considered as tidal marshland. Most of the remaining land
was below the flood levels reached by hurricanes of 1938, 1944 and
1954. Id. at 307, 197 A.2d at 771-72 n.2.
132. The ordinance permitted the following flood plain uses:
1. Parks, playgrounds, marinas, boathouses, landings and
docks, clubhouses, and necessary uses.
2. Wildlife sanctuaries operated by governmental units or non-
profit organizations.
3. Farming, truck and nursery gardening.
4. Motor vehicle parking as an accessory to a permitted use in
this district or an adjacent district.
Id. at 306, 197 A.2d at 771 n.1.
133. Id.
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for a limited time.J3 4  The court concluded that the zoning ren-
dered the use of plaintiffs' land impossible, 35 accepting the testi-
134. Id. at 310, 197 A.2d at 773.
135. The court examined the uses and stated:
An analysis of the uses permitted under § 22.2 of the zoning
regulations in a flood plain district clearly demonstrates that
the use of the plaintiffs' land has been, for all practical pur-
poses, rendered impossible.
Id. at 309, 197 A.2d at 772 (emphasis added).
In holding the flood plain district unconstitutional as applied to the
properties of the plaintiffs the court noted:
Where most of the value of a person's property has to be sacri-
ficed so that community welfare may be served, and where the
owner does not directly benefit from the evil avoided ... the
occasion is appropriate for the exercise of eminent domain.
Id. at 312, 197 A.2d at 774.
The reasons given by the court explaining why the permitted uses
did not allow any practical use of the land are worth quoting since a
similar rationale may well be applicable to many other flood plain
situations. For simplicity of analysis, the reasons are numbered and
given headings:(1) Public parks and playgrounds.
"First, to restrict the use of privately owned property to parks
and playgrounds bars the development of land for residential
or business purposes and raises serious questions as to the con-
stitutionality of the restriction... . The practical effect of this
limitation on use is to restrict potential buyers of the property
to town or governmental uses, thus depreciating the value
of the property."
(2) Marina, boathouse or a landing dock.
"Second, the property of the plaintiffs is about half a mile from
Long Island Sound, and consequently, the property could not
be used for a marina, a boathouse or a landing and dock."
(3) Clubhouse.
"Third, the .. .zoning regulations contain no definition of a
clubhouse... Although the term 'clubhouse' may be con-
strued broadly, the presence of one on the plaintiffs' land, con-
sidering the acreage involved, would have little effect in pre-
venting substantial diminution in the value of the land."
(4) Wildlife sanctuaries.
"Fourth ... the regulations [permit] the use of the property
for wildlife sanctuaries operated by governmental units or non-
profit organizations. Obviously, such a use does not provide
the landowner with any reasonable or practical means of
obtaining income or a return from his property. Again, this
use contemplates a diminution in land value and subsequent
acquisition by some governmental agency, either by purchase
or by condemnation."
(5) Farming, truck and nursery gardening.
"Fifth, the regulations also permit farming, truck and nursery
gardening. At the public hearing, a real estate expert testified
that farming has long since been ruled out in this area."
(6) Motor vehicle parking.
"Finally, the regulations also permit motor vehicle parking as
an accessory to a permitted use in the flood plain district or
adjacent district. But under § 22.3 of the regulations, the land
cannot be filled or paved except by special exception granted by
the defendant under stringent conditions, and then only for a
limited time."
Id. at 309-10, 197 A.2d at 772-73.
1972]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
mony of the plaintiffs' real estate expert that the regulations
had depreciated the value of his land at least 75 per cent.130
Several additional factors were noted by the court which
may have contributed to the holding of invalidity. First, it was
noted that some of the property was under contract for sale and
could be used for houses readily salable in the "price range of
$15,000 to $17,000 per unit"'13 7 after needed filling. Second, the
city had levied a sewer assessment of over $11,000 against some
of the properties. The court found that because the regulations
prohibited any building on the land other than the permitted
uses, the sewer system could be utilized "for no practical pur-
pose so long as the property is privately owned. '138 The city
was in the contradictory position of charging the landowners for
services to serve development and yet prohibiting development.
Third, the absence of a provision allowing permanent fill to raise
the elevation of the land may have been important,8 9 since with-
out permanent fill to protect against flooding the land could not
be economically used.
A later lower court case held that an ordinance permitting
an even larger number of uses in a flood-prone area was nonethe-
less invalid since it prevented all practical use of the land. The
case of Hofkin v. Whitemarsh Township Zoning Board of Ad-
justment140 strongly disapproved as applied to plaintiff's land
regulations which prohibited all structures.' 4 ' The court held
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See Comment, 4 NAT. REs. J. 445 (1965).
140. 88 Montg. 68, 42 Pa. D.&C.2d 417 (Pa. C.P. 1967), cited and dis-
cussed in Hess, The Present Status of Flood Plain Zoning in Pennsylvania,
40 PA. B. Ass'N Q. 578 (1969).
141. The court stated:
We, therefore, have no hesitation in holding that the ex-
cessive regulations and prohibitions of the flood plain ordi-
nance are so restrictive and confiscatory, when applied to ap-
pellants' tract, that they are tantamount to the exercise of the
powers of eminent domain. They effectively exclude any type
of structure upon the land, or any practical use of the land
designated Flood Plain Conservation District.
88 Montg. at 72, 42 Pa. D.&C.2d at 423. The ordinance permitted the fol-
lowing uses in the Flood Plain Conservation District:
1. Cultivation and harvesting crops according to recognized
soil conservation practices.
2. Pasture and grazing land.
3. Outdoor plant nursery.
4. Recreational use such as: Park, day camp, picnic grove,
golf course, hunting, fishing, and boating club, excluding
structures.
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that this was tantamount to the exercise of the powers of emi-
nent domain. 142  The court did not, however, base its decision
solely on the fact that there were no profitable uses available to
the landowner. It felt that the regulations did not bear a rea-
sonable relation to the public health or safety.'
43
A third case, which considered at length the practicality of
permissible uses, must be deemed a leading case in the area
because of the clarity of the court's reasoning and extensive
treatment of issues. In Morris County Land Improvement Co.
v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Township,14 4 the New Jersey Supreme
Court held invalid in its entirety a Meadow Development Zone
which applied to certain swamp lands in the township of Parsip-
pany-Troy Hills in New Jersey. The issue was not only prohibi-
tion of most structural uses, but, like Dooley, the strict regula-
tion of reclamation or improvement of the land. Although the
5. Forestry, lumbering and reforestation, excluding storage and
mill structures.
6. Harvesting of any wild crops such as marsh hay, ferns, moss,
berries, or wild rice.
7. Game farm, fish hatchery (excluding rearing structures),
hunting and fishing reserves.
8. Wildlife sanctuary, woodland preserves, arboretum.
9. Outlet installations for sewage treatment plants and sealed
public water supply wells.
10. Utility transmission lines.
Id. at 70,42 Pa. D.&C.2d at 419-20.
142. With regard to the uses listed in note 141 supra, the court
stated:
We have carefully studied the record .... In our opinion
the agricultural and kindred uses permitted are utterly im-
practical and completely profitless. The hunting and fishing
uses permitted on this tract, and particularly 'a boating club,
approach the fantastic. The only practical, but profitless, per-
mitted uses of the land are 'parkW and 'wildlife sanctuary'.
The profitable and practical permitted use for 'sealed public
water supply wells' is probably rendered impractical for this
tract by reason of the nearby facility of the Philadelphia Subur-
ban Water Company. The permitted use for 'utility transmis-
sion lines' may have some practicable and profitable applica-
tion to the tract.
Id. at 70, 42 Pa. D.&C.2d at 420 (emphasis added).
143. The court stated:
We cannot see any way in which the residential develop-
ment would endanger public health or impair public safety.
The entire area is served by a public water system and by
public sanitary sewers. Neither on-site sewage disposal systems
nor wells would be relied upon. Any threat to life or property
by periodic floods could be quickly and effectively eliminated
by piping the small stream across the tract to a properly
designed culvert..., and by some regrading of the tract which
is entirely feasible.
Id. at 72, 42 Pa. D.&C.2d at 422.
144. 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963).
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regulation permitted a wide range of open space uses, 14 and
additional uses were permitted as special exceptions by the
Board of Adjustment, reclamation was severely limited by im-
possibly stringent provisions. The court stated that the evidence
made it clear that the prime object of the regulations was to
"retain the land substantially in its natural state."140  The court
discussed at length the permitted uses and objected to the pub-
lic nature of many of those uses, 1 47 holding that a regulation is
confiscatory and beyond the police power where the regulation
restricts use to the extent that land cannot "practically be util-
ized for any reasonable purpose or when the only permitted uses
are those to which the property is not adapted or which are eco-
nomically infeasible.' 48  The court noted that the only real dif-
145. The court described the following permitted uses:
[A] gricultural uses; raising of woody or herbaceous plants com-
mercial greenhouses; raising of aquatic plants, fish and fish food
(with a one-family dwelling as an adjunct to any of these
uses, provided its lowest floor was a specified distance above
flood level); outdoor recreational uses operated by a govern-
mental division or agency; conservation uses "including drain-
age control, forestry, wildlife sanctuaries and facilities for mak-
ing same available and useful to the public"; hunting and fish-
ing preserves; public utility transmission lines and substations;
radio or television transmitting stations and antenna towers;
and township sewage treatment plants and water supply
facilities.
Id. at 545, 193 A.2d at 236.
146. Id. at 551, 193 A.2d at 239.
147. In examining the permitted uses the court noted that:
[M] any of the previously listed permitted uses in the zone are
public or quasi-public in nature, rather than of the type avail-
able to the ordinary private landowner as a reasonable means of
obtaining a return from his property, i.e., outdoor recreational
uses to be operated only by some governmental unit, conser-
vation uses and activities, township sewage treatment plant
and water facilities and public utility transmission lines, sub-
stations and radio and television transmitting stations and
towers. All in all, about the only practical use which can be
made of property in the zone is a hunting or fishing preserve
or a wildlife sanctuary, none of which can be considered
productive.
It is equally obvious from the proofs, and legally of the
highest significance, that the main purpose of enacting regula-
tions with the practical effect of retaining the meadows in
their natural state was for a public benefit. This benefit is
twofold, with somewhat interrelated aspects: first, use of the
area as a water detention basin in aid of flood control in the
lower reaches of the Passaic Valley far beyond this munici-
pality; and second, preservation of the land as open space for the
benefits which would accrue to the local public from an un-
developed use such as that of a nature refuge by Wildlife
(which paid taxes on it).
Id. at 553, 193 A.2d at 240 (emphasis added).
148. Id. at 557, 193 A.2d at 242.
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ference between such regulations and a physical taking was that
the former left the owner with the onus of taxation. 4 Through-
out the opinion the court emphasized and reemphasized the ef-
fect of the restrictive special exception provisions was to prevent
any improvement of land. Like Dooley and Whitemarsh, Parsip-
pany suggests that permission of a large number of uses may
not save a zoning scheme where all of the permitted uses are un-
economic.
Open space restrictions in both urban and rural areas com-
monly limit land uses to activities such as camping, private parks,
wildlife sanctuaries, and recreation. These may, in fact, enable
economic uses for rural areas with low land values. However,
it is doubtful that such uses allow an economic return for re-
creational lands located along lakes and rivers where property
values and taxes are often high. Further, farming in urban
areas may be undesirable as well as uneconomic because of
divided ownership, insufficient acreage, lack of adequate access,
or because agricultural uses conflict with neighboring uses.
a. Fill or Other Land Reclamation
Parsippany and Dooley raise questions concerning the con-
stitutionality of regulations which restrict land to low value uses
where natural limitations of lands require expensive fill or other
reclamation techniques before structural use can be made of the
lands. Without such fill, no practical use may be possible. How-
ever, the placement of fill in swampy areas may destroy duck-
nesting grounds and fish-spawning grounds, and if placed in
floodways may obstruct flood flows and cause serious damage to
other lands.
Few cases deal specifically with regulations which attempt
to prevent fill or other reclamation to protect resource values
or prevent obstruction to flood flows, but a relatively large num-
ber of traditional zoning cases have considered the reasonable-
ness of zoning classifications (such as residential zoning) appli-
cable to lands with erosion problems, steep slopes, swampiness,
flooding, or other physical limitations. 5 0 In these cases the costs
of reclamation have been considered one element relevant to the
reasonableness of the classifications.
149. Id.
150. See generally cases cited in notes 161-95 infra and accompany-
ing text.
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The Parsippany decision suggests that if an ordinance or
statute prohibits or severely restricts fill which is necessary for
some economic use of land and the fill will not cause serious
and substantial off-site harm, the regulation is unconstitutional
as depriving the land of all reasonable use. The court recognized
that a landowner cannot ordinarily be prevented from improving
his land if improvements are necessary before the landowner can
make some economic use of this land, discussing at length the
controls upon reclamation. 151 Dissatisfaction with the prohibi-
tion against reclamation appears to underlie the entire decision,
which invalidated the ordinance in toto. The court noted that
"so-called permitted uses" were severely limited by impossibly
stringent reclamation provisions.15 2 The court concluded that
where land improvement was possible which would make feasible
productive uses otherwise impossible, a regulation practically
prohibiting all reclamation was unconstitutional.' 53
In the 1966 case of Commissioner of Natural Resources v.
151. The court stated:
These so-called permitted uses amounted, for the most part to
strict regulation of land reclamation in aid of uses allowed as
of right. Thus, a special exception, with particular conditions,
was required for any permitted use which involved a change
in any drainage ditch, for the removal of earth products, such
as gravel, sand, fill-dirt and peat, and for the diking, damm-
ing or filling of any land within the zone with an existing ele-
vation of less than 175 feet above sea level (apparently this lim-
itation would encompass practically all the land in the zone).
The standards and conditions for exceptions to permit re-
moval of earth products and filling included intricate site plan
approval by the Planning Board together with studies and re-
ports by other township officials and agencies before favorable
action could be taken by the Board of Adjustment. Moreover,
no filling was allowed except by the use of material taken from
land within the zone. In addition, approval was required of
ponds and lakes which would inevitably be created by a filling
operation (since the fill had to come from within the zone and
the only suitable material was the sand and gravel found below
the first two strata of soil).
Id. at 546-47, 193 A.2d at 236-37 (emphasis added; citation omitted).
152. The court used the following language in referring to provi-
sions preventing reclamation:
We need not repeat the nullifying effect of the use and
soil reclamation restrictions on any productive use of property
in the zone, which is apparent on the face of the ordinance
when viewed in the light of the explanatory testimony.
Without reclamation, nothing but a passive use is possible.
Land improvement is rendered practically impossible by the
almost prohibitory filling and removal regulations, and, even
if it could be attained, permitted private owner uses are most
narrow indeed. The case is unique in that reclamation is nec-
essary before any worthwhile use is possible, except the com-
mercial removal of the sand and gravel natural resource.
Id. at 557-58, 193 A.2d at 243 (emphasis added).
153. Id. at 558, 193 A.2d at 243.
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Volpe & Co., 154 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts considered the constitutionality of an order prohibiting the
filling of a salt marsh. The approach of the court is interesting
even though no decision was reached on the merits and the case
was remanded for further findings. The defendant in this case
was the owner of about 50 acres of salt marsh adjacent to the
coast of Wareham, Massachusetts. He wished to dredge a chan-
nel through the marsh and to fill portions for the construction of
houses and had notified the appropriate authorities of his inten-
tion pursuant to a Massachusetts statute. After a hearing, the
Director of Marine Fisheries ordered that "in the interest of pro-
tecting marine fisheries and maintaining the ecological compo-
nents of this estuarine complex... no fill of any type be placed
upon that area known as Broad Marsh."' 5  The defendant ig-
nored the order and the Commissioner of Natural Resources and
the Director of Marine Fisheries brought action to enjoin viola-
tion of the order and to require removal of fill placed in the
marsh in violation of the order. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts acknowledged that protecting marine
fisheries was a valid public objective but stated that regulations
to achieve such an objective must not deprive defendant of all
practical use of his land. Finding the trial record insufficient to
decide the taking issue, the court remanded for further findings
with respect to the economic impact of the regulations upon the
landowner.156
Several Michigan cases also suggest that a landowner has a
right to fill to provide some economic use for his lands. In Plum
Hollow Golf & Country Club v. Southfield'17 the denial of a per-
mit for the use of dry rubbish (the only economic fill material
154. 349 Mass. 104, 206 N.E.2d 666 (1965). See discussion in Com-
ment, 6 NAT. Rs. J. 8 (1966).
155. Commissioner of Nat. Res. v. S. Volpe & Co., 349 Mass. 104,
106, 206 N.E.2d 666, 668 (1965).
156. The court directed specific findings concerning:
[1] The uses which can be made of the locus in its natural state
(a) independently of other land of the owner in the area;
(b) in conjunction with other land of the owner.
[2] The asserted value of the locus for each of the [preceding]
five years ....
[3] The cost of the locus to the defendant.
[4] The present fair market value of the locus (a) subject to
the limitations imposed by the Commissioner; (b) free of
such limitations.
[5] The estimated cost of the improvements proposed by the
defendant.
Id. at 111-12, 206 N.E.2d at 671-72.
157. 341 Mich. 84, 67 N.W.2d 122 (1954).
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in this instance) to fill a marshy area along a stream was inval-
idated since the land otherwise had no practical use. In Keller v.
Township of Farmington'5 8 a court invalidated a similar denial
which prevented fill in flood plain areas adjacent to the Rouge
River. The application for a fill permit had been refused by the
town board partially on the grounds that filling would remove
a flood plain of the river and "thus have a tendency during high
water to cause the river to back up and possibly flood other areas
of the township."159
Other decisions, though not dealing with a prohibition of
filling, have considered the reasonableness of traditional zoning
classifications in light of physical limitations on the land. 00
Zoning classifications must permit sufficiently remunerative
uses to allow economic reclamation and developent for areas
with resource limitations. For example, in Forde v. Miami
Beach,16 1 the Florida Supreme Court held invalid as applied to
plaintiff's property a zoning ordinance which classified certain
properties facing the Atlantic Ocean in the City of Miami Beach
for single-family residential use. The plaintiff's ocean front lots
had an average depth of 240 feet at the time the ordinance was
adopted. Subsequent to passage of the ordinance, hurricanes,
storms, and ocean currents eroded the lots and reduced their
average depth to only 60 or 70 feet. The plaintiff agreed that
the original zoning had been correct at the time the ordinance
was adopted but argued that because of the subsequent storm
damage and erosion the classification of the land for single-
family residences was no longer reasonable since the classifica-
tion prevented any beneficial use of the land. The plaintiff
argued that the land would require extensive reclamation includ-
ing the building of seawalls, refilling, and building of groins in
order to make any use of the property for either private estates
or hotels or apartments. The estimated reclamation cost of be-
tween $7,500 and $15,000 per lot rendered construction of single-
family residences uneconomic. There was also evidence that
there was no present demand for single-family estates but that a
demand did exist for multiple-family dwellings. The court held
the ordinance invalid since under the restrictions the property
would remain unimproved and unproductive because the cost of
improving the land could not be recouped with residential use of
158. 358 Mich. 106, 99 N.W.2d 578 (1959).
159. Id. at 109, 99 N.W.2d at 580.
160. See cases cited in notes 161-95 infra.
161. 146 Fla. 676, 1 So. 2d 642 (1941).
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the property.162  The court implicitly recognized that the land-
owner had a right to restore and improve his property and that
a regulatory classification must permit sufficiently remunerative
uses so that reclamation can be economically undertaken. Oth-
er cases take the same line of reasoning.1
6 3
162. Id. at 685, 1 So. 2d at 647.
163. For example, the Arkansas Supreme Court, in Little Rock v.
Hocott, 220 Ark. 421, 247 S.W.2d 1012 (1952), ordered reclassification of
an area with rough terrain and steep slopes from a one-family residen-
tial district to an apartment district, apparently because the area could
not be economically developed for single family residences. Grading,
paving, terracing, and other improvements to prepare the site for apart-
ment purposes would have cost $50,000. Id. at 423, 247 S.W.2d at 1013.
Zoning regulations which apply to swamp lands or other areas with
high ground water have quite often been litigated. These areas in their
natural state are usually not suitable for structural development and
must be filled with gravel or similar materials. Usually courts have
held that permitted uses must be sufficiently lucrative to permit such
reclamation. For example a New York Court in Town of Hempstead v.
Lynne, 32 Misc. 2d 312, 222 N.Y.S.2d 526 (Sup. Ct. 1961), invalidated a
residential zoning classification for a marshy area. The landowner had
spent $140,000 for hydraulic fill to bring the marshland to a permissible
level for development as a shopping center prior to the time the area
was rezoned for residential purposes. This court, in a detailed cost
analysis, noted the cost of the parcel, the cost of the fill and other
expenses associated with preparation of the site for use as a shopping
center, and the cost of new fill needed to bring the site to a higher
elevation required for residential use by a town building code.
The costs were so great that if the site were developed for resi-
dences, a net loss of investment of over $90,000 could be expected. This
the court found to be an "economic taking" of private property and
was confiscatory. The original intended use for the lots as a shopping
center was allowed, permitting the user a reasonable rate of return on
the land.
Similar cases may be cited where the cost of improvement or the
natural unsuitability of a marshy area for permitted uses has resulted
in a finding that the use classification is unreasonable or a "taking".
See, e.g., Baltimore v. Cohn, 204 Md. 523, 105 A.2d 482 (1954) (residen-
tial zoning for property covered with weeds, brush, and stagnant water
held unreasonable and issuance of permit for construction of truck termi-
nals ordered); Fenner v. Muskegon, 331 Mich. 732, 50 N.W.2d 210 (1951)
(residential classification for marshy lands subject to flooding invali-
dated); North Muskegon v. Miller, 249 Mich. 52, 227 N.W. 743 (1929)
(a primarily residential zoning classification for marshy lowlands in-
validated). Contra, Hodge v. Luckett, 357 S.W.2d 303 (Ky. Ct. App.
1962) (residential classification for a swampy area upheld despite a
showing that it was not suited for residences); Anderson v. Wilmington,
347 Mass. 302, 197 N.E.2d 682 (1964) (residential zoning for a swampy
tract upheld in spite of high improvement costs; evidence indicated 25%
of the town swamp land); Filister v. Minneapolis, 270 Minn. 53, 133
N.W.2d 500 (1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 14 (1965) (residential classifi-
cation for a swampy area upheld).
A number of cases have considered flooding threats relevant to a
zoning classification. Usually the courts have held that uses allowing
a high rate of return must be allowed to justify the costs of improve-
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These cases present an enigma to the municipal planner who
recommends that lands with severe physical limitations be zoned
for single family residences, forestry, recreation, or other low
density uses. Such uses may be the most appropriate use of
lands for the community as a whole if there is need for open
space or low density uses. Large private expenditures to im-
ment.
Prospective costs of land improvement were noted in Kracke v.
Weinberg, 197 Md. 339, 79 A.2d 387 (1951), where the Maryland Court
of Appeals held invalid, as applied to plaintiff's land, an ordinance
which reclassified land from commercial to residential uses. The land
had streams running through it and was rough; leveling off the land to
build houses would have required a prohibitive expenditure of money.
The court noted that rezoning to residential use prevented the owners
from using it, "not only for its most suitable use, but for any practical
use at all." Id. at 346, 79 A.2d at 391.
The prohibitive costs of improving land otherwise unsuited for resi-
dential development were also considered in In re Garbev, Inc., 385 Pa.
328, 122 A.2d 682 (1956), in which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
held invalid a residential classification as applied to a thirteen acre
tract of rough land that was traversed by a stream. This stream
drained approximately 3.675 square miles and caused considerable flash
flooding in case of heavy rains. A chancellor found that costs to confine,
relocate, or control the stream would be great and the land could not be
prepared for residential use except at "prohibitive expense" and even
then conditions (such as a nearby railroad) "would prevent the sale of
houses sufficiently expensive to permit recoupment of the cost of ren-
dering the land usable." Id. at 334, 122 A.2d at 684. In light of this
evidence, the court found that the residential classification was confisca-
tory.
The Illinois Supreme Court, in La Salle Nat'l Bank v. Highland
Park, 27 Ill. 2d 350, 189 N.E.2d 302 (1963), held unconstitutional as
arbitrary and confiscatory a three acre minimum lot size, "'A' Country
Estate District," as applied to a 20 acre tract of land. The land was
diagonally traversed by a drainage ditch described as being a branch
of one fork of the Chicago River. Part of the tract was below the flood
line and water from the ditch occasionally flooded plaintiffs land.
While the suit was pending the city enacted a "flood plain ordi-
nance" which declared a flood plain to be "'that continuous land area
adjacent to a water course whose elevation is equal to or below the
flood base elevation.'" Id. at 353, 189 N.E.2d at 304. The ordinance
provided that no new building could be erected within the flood plain
unless the lowest floor was at least two feet above the base elevation
for the site. Further, the ordinance specified that if fill or construction
would displace waters in the flood plain, a flood reservoir should be
constructed equal in volume to the fill or construction deposited below
the flood base elevation.
While the court technically was not considering the validity of the
floodplain ordinance, but only the classification of the country estate
district, the court clearly felt that the flooding issue was vital in the dis-
position of the case. On the issue of improvement, the court noted that
the same amount of fill would be required for three acre lots as for one-
half acre lots, and observed that in spite of the strenuous arguments
of the city to the contrary, the same effect would be felt on the flood-
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prove these lands may be contrary to the economic interests of
the community and in addition, it may be difficult and expensive
for the community to extend roads, sewers, and water supply
facilities to such properties. On the other hand, because the
lands are subject to severe natural limitations, landowners may
be without economic uses unless their properties are zoned for
high density multi-family residential, commercial, or industrial
uses which are sufficiently remunerative to economically justify
land improvement. While strong public policy arguments might
be made to regulate shoreland areas with development limita-
tions to low density development, attempts may face considera-
ble adverse legal precedent.
b. Where All Economic Uses are Nuisance-Like
As mentioned earlier, courts have been very receptive to
regulations which prevent the establishment of nuisance-like
uses or require the abatement of existing ones. 0 4 Usually a
restriction on nuisance-like uses will prevent only one of many
potential uses which can be made of land. However, in some sit-
uations all practical uses may be nuisance-like. A few cases have
considered regulations which restrict only nuisance-like uses and
yet the effect of the restrictions is to deprive the owner of all
practical use because all practical uses are nuisance-like. Gen-
erally the regulations have been sustained.0 5
Consider, for example, areas with high ground water,
swamps, areas subject to flooding, or steep slopes in the midst of
a residential district. Lands subject to resource limitations may
require expensive fill or improvements before any sort of struc-
tural use is possible. The costs of improvement might not be re-
couped by residential use, yet industrial or commercial uses
might be incompatible and nuisance-like in the surroundings.
Even residential uses might have nuisance-like effects if the resi-
plain below, in light of the reservoir requirements. Id. at 353-54,
189 N.E.2d at 304-05. The court rejected arguments that the greater
density of residence would significantly decrease the amount of avail-
able land to absorb the flood waters and would increase the rate of
runoff.
In Board of Adjustment v. Shanbour, 435 P.2d 569 (Okla. 1967), the
Oklahoma Supreme Court ordered a variance issued to allow construc-
tion of a drive-in movie theater in an area zoned for residential use on
parcels that were subject to flooding. The land was lower than ad-joining property and it was economically impractical to correct the
flooding and develop the tract for residential purposes.
164. See cases cited and text accompanying notes 70-89 supra.
165. See cases cited in notes 166-79 infra.
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dences obstructed flood flows, created erosion problems, or
caused water pollution due to inadequately operating onsite sew-
age disposal systems.
In Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Los Angees,100 the
California Supreme Court upheld agricultural and residential
zoning regulations aimed at restricting nuisance-like gravel op-
erations on lands subject to flooding. The land had few or no
other economic uses due to the flooding. The plaintiff owned 348
acres of land composed of rock, sand, and gravel to a depth of
30 feet and generally situated in a watercourse. The trial court
found that this property had substantial value for sand and grav-
el operations but not for other uses. 10 7 Two residential com-
munities adjoined the properties and the trend of land develop-
ment was in the direction of the properties. The area had a repu-
tation as a haven for sufferers of respiratory ailments and was
inhabited by many such sufferers. There was substantial evi-
dence that extraction of sand and gravel, even if conducted with
all possible safeguards, would create quantities of dust which
would be carried to the residences and sanitariums. The court
endorsed regulations designed to prevent uses injurious to the
general public,168 holding that since the local legislative body
had concluded that the prohibited use could not be had without
injury to others, and since this was a question upon which rea-
sonable minds could differ, the local legislative determination
was conclusive. 1 9 In considering the issue of denial of all rea-
sonable use, the court observed that there had been testimony
before the legislative body that the property could be devoted
to certain other uses such as certain types of horticulture, recrea-
tion, stabling horses, cattle feeding and grazing, chicken raising,
dog kennels, fish hatcheries, and golf courses. However, the eco-
nornic value of the lands for these uses was minimal because of
the flooding threat.170  The court sustained the restriction de-
spite the severe diminution in value.
166. 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, appeal dismissed,
371 U.S. 36 (1962).
167. The trial court noted that the land had value for
rock, sand and gravel excavation but 'no appreciable economic
value' for any other purpose, and in view of the 'continuing
flood hazard and the nature of the soiL', any suggestion that the
property has economic value for any other use, including those
uses for which it was zoned, 'is preposterous'.
Id. at 519, 370 P.2d at 344, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 640 (emphasis added).
168. Id. at 524, 370 P.2d at 348, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 644.
169. Id.
170. The court noted:
It must be conceded that in relation to its value for the ex-
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In Walker v. Board of County Commissioners,71 the Mary-
land Court of Appeals upheld a county ordinance which zoned
a section of land for agricultural and residential use. The plain-
tiff gave evidence that his land was swampy and could not profit-
ably be used for any of the uses permitted by the ordinance. In-
come from existing uses had not equalled taxes on the property
and plaintiff proposed to sell the land for use as an oil refinery
site. But an industrial use would have been inconsistent and
nuisance-like in the residential and farming area. Avoiding an
economic test for "reasonable" use, the court adopted a "possible"
use criterion, holding that the ordinance does "not deprive the
appellants of many uses for which their property is reasonably
adapted .... 2
Courts in several more recent decisions involving proposed
rezoning of swamp lands have refused to sanction reclassification
despite evidence that an existing classification offered little or no
economic return on the land. In each case the decision was
based upon the ground that the proposed uses would harm other
lands and that the plight of the landowner was at least in part
self-created. In the most interesting of the decisions, the Su-
preme Court of Minnesota in Filister v. Minneapolis'7 3 refused to
hold "confiscatory" a residential classification for swamplands.
Evidence was introduced showing that the cost of piling, filling,
and other improvements to prepare the site for residential use
traction of rock, sand and gravel the value of the property for
any of the described uses is relatively small if not minimal,
and that as to a considerable part of it seasonal flooding might
prevent its continuous use for any purpose.
Id. at 530, 370 P.2d at 351, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 647.
171. 208 Md. 72, 116 A.2d 393 (1955).
172. Id., 116 A.2d at 404-05.
173. 270 Minn. 53, 133 N.W.2d 500 (1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
14 (1965). See also Hodge v. Luckett, 357 S.W.2d 303 (Ky. Ct. App.
1962), where the Kentucky Court of Appeals refused to approve the
change in zoning for an 18.5 acre tract from residential to light indus-
trial. Substantial evidence was introduced to show that the area, which
was low and frequently covered by water, was unsuited for residential
use but suited for industrial use. The court refused to find that the
area was totally unsuited for residences since "its suitability for resi-
dential purposes is a relative proposition." Id. at 305. The court found
that such a change would be spot zoning not consistent with a sound
land use plan. Further, the court held that "[t]he time for the owner
to speak was when the unfortunate classification of his property was
first proposed or put into effect." Id. Most significantly, the court
stated that in order to justify a reclassification a landowner must
"show by clear and convincing proof that there will be no substantial
resulting detriment to others." Id. the evidence introduced suggested
that residential property in the community would have been adversely
affected.
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was so great that the existing classification was confiscatory.
The court went beyond the conclusion of the lower court that
some economic use of the lands for residential use did exist, ob-
serving that the proposed apartment buildings would adversely
affect residential buildings in surrounding areas. It further
noted that the owners of the swamp should have complained at
the time the residential classification was imposed and not waited
until other nearby landowners had relied upon the classification.
The court held that a landowner must show not only "confisca-
tion", but also that the relief sought would not result in substan-
tial detriment to neighboring property. 1 74 The holding has broad
implications for any case contesting the validity of open space
classifications which severely limit land use in order to prevent
off-site effects such as obstructions to flood flows or water pollu-
tion.
In Hamer v. Town of Ross' 75 the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia upheld a single-family residential classification for certain
flooded areas despite evidence that improvement costs would be
prohibitively expensive. The California decision, like Filister,
was partially based upon the ground that the landowner should
have complained of the classification earlier and was estopped
from doing so later. In this case, a creek which periodically
flooded traversed the plaintiff's lands. To render the property
suitable for erection of dwellings the plaintiff would have had to
expend $12,500 for flood control devices and $30,000 for site im-
provement. 1 76  The remaining undeveloped portion of the prop-
erty could not profitably be developed for single-family resi-
dences "because the costs of flood control and other site improve-
ments would be greater than the value of the improved lots.""
The court noted that the proposed multiple-family dwellings
would have detrimental effects on surrounding residential prop-
erties. Rejecting plaintiff's claim that the classification confis-
cated her property, the court held that since a portion of the
whole land was utilized by the plaintiff as a residence, she could
only contend that the ordinance rendered the remaining portion
174. The court stated:
[I]t was not only incumbent on the plaintiffs to show that the
ordinance was confiscatory, but they had the burden of proving
by clear and convincing evidence that the relief they sought
would not result in any substantial detriment to neighboring
property improved in reliance on the validity of the ordinance.
270 Minn. at 60, 133 N.W.2d at 505.
175. 59 Cal. 2d 776, 382 P.2d 375, 31 Cal. Rptr. 335 (1963).
176. Id. at 779, 382 P.2d at 377, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 337.
177. Id. at 788, 382 P.2d at 383, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
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valueless. A showing that only a portion of the whole area was
rendered valueless was not sufficient to show confiscation. The
court in refusing to invalidate the single-family classification ob-
served that the plaintiff purchased her land with full knowledge
of its topography.178 But although the court refused to invali-
date the use classification as applied to plaintiff's property, it
was not wholly unsympathetic to her plight. The court invali-
dated the one acre minimum lot size requirement as applied to
plaintiff's lands and endorsed the granting of additional vari-
ances and exceptions from the local zoning which would be nec-
essary to allow construction of single-family residences on lots
not smaller than 10,000 square feet.179
c. Unsafe Uses
Most cases upholding stringent regulations have involved
situations where the proposed development posed threats to pub-
lic safety or neighboring lands. A few cases, however, have in-
volved circumstances where there was evidence that the proposed
uses would harm the user, his guests, or purchasers of his prop-
erty. In McCarthy v. Manliattan Beach 80 the California Su-
preme Court sustained a zoning ordinance which restricted
ocean-front property to beach recreation purposes. The ordi-
nance had been adopted to implement a comprehensive plan and
allowed only the operation of beach recreational facilities for an
admission fee. The only structures permitted were "lifeguard
towers, open smooth wire fences and small signs."'' The owners
claimed that this classification was confiscatory, arbitrary, and
had not been passed in good faith and had been conceived to de-
press property values so that the land could be inexpensively
acquired for park purposes. The court failed to detect bad faith
in adopting the ordinance despite considerable evidence to the
178. The court stated:
[P]laintiff's contention is that the topography of her land
should enable her to place structures upon her property which
her neighbors could not put upon their property. A right ac-
corded to plaintiff to construct multiple dwellings upon her
property would result in her foisting upon her neighbors the
detriment of the loss of a one-family dwelling area in order to
relieve her from disadvantages inherent in the composition of
her land. Yet she purchased her property with full knowledge
of its topography.
Id.
179. Id. at 791, 382 P.2d at 385, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 345.
180. 41 Cal. 2d 879, 264 P.2d 932 (1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 817
(1954).
181. Id. at 884, 264 P.2d at 934-35.
1972]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:1
contrary. In considering the confiscation question, the court ac-
knowledged that plaintiffs did not receive any income from the
property but had paid substantial taxes on it. 1 82 One plaintiff
introduced testimony that he had attempted to fence the beach for
private use but that the fence was torn down by the public and
that the fence could not be successfully maintained around the
beach property because of the threat of mob violence. Nonethe-
less, the court did not accept the considerable evidence that there
was no practical use for the land and held that plaintiffs failed
to prove that they could not put the property to beneficial use in
conformity with the zoning regulations.'5 3
While the court's conclusion that there were beneficial uses
for the land permitted by the ordinance was not well supported
in light of the facts presented, the decision may be explained by
the court's view that it should not substitute its judgment for
that of the city council where the propriety of the zoning classi-
fication is fairly debatable. 8 4 And while the zoning classifica-
tion did not in fact permit reasonable use of the land, the de-
cision is supported by the "unsafe use" rationale. The plaintiffs
introduced testimony that they wished to build residences within
the present beach area. There was evidence that the property
was from time to time covered by storm waters and was subject
to erosion. Although a witness testified that the residences
would be constructed on pilings to protect them against water
damage and erosion, the lower court had concluded that the
"safety of the proposed construction of houses thereon was 'a
question upon which reasonable minds might differ.' ,,,s The
court held that the question was not whether it was humanly
possible to build safe houses but whether the ones in the pro-
posed plan would be safe.'8 6 One may well wonder what would
have been the result if the plaintiffs had wanted to establish a
substantial commercial structure which would be more exten-
sively protected.
McCarthy may be interpreted as holding that unless an indi-
vidual can show that a safe use can be made of land he has not
met the burden of showing that restrictions deny some reason-
able use. This reasoning proceeds on the premise that no man
has a right to use his property in a manner unsafe to himself or
182. Id., 264 P.2d at 935.
183. Id. at 891-92, 264 P.2d at 939.
184. Id. at 890, 264 P.2d at 938.
185. Id. at 889, 264 P.2d at 937.
186. Id. at 888, 264 P.2d at 937.
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others who may use it. If the threat were simply to himself,
some courts might hold that regulation would not be sufficiently
in the public interest.'8 7 In the McCarthy situation justification
could be found in protecting others who might purchase the resi-
dences. Protection of innocent purchasers has been cited in oth-
er cases as a valid objective for flood plain regulations.1 88
In Spiegle v. Beach Haven8 9 the New Jersey Supreme Court
sustained dune and fence ordinances for a beach area subject to
severe storm damage. No construction was allowed between the
mean water line and a building line except for fences, sand
fences, boardwalks, steps to permit access to the beach, pavilions
or similar small platforms, and bulkheads. The building line bi-
sected several of plaintiffs' lots, and apparently prevented con-
struction of any building on two of the lots, one of which was al-
most entirely oceanward of the building line and the other com-
pletely oceanward. 19 0 The plaintiffs argued that the ordinance
was unconstitutional because it deprived the lands of any bene-
ficial use. The court noted that since the burden of demonstrat-
ing undue restriction on beneficial use was upon the plaintiffs, an
essential element of any plaintiff's case was the existence of
"some present or potential beneficial use of which he has been de-
prived."'' While the court did not define a sufficient showing
,of a potentially beneficial use, it noted the unrebutted proof that
it would be unsafe to construct buildings oceanward of the build-
ing line, and suggested that unless plaintiffs could show that some
safe as well as economic use could be made of the lands, they
would not meet their burden of showing that the regulations pre-
vented some reasonable use.19 2
187. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922),
in which the Court held that the contested regulations affected a lim-
ited class of individuals and were therefore not sufficiently in the pub-
lic interest to justify their enactment. Also, the regulations too severely
diminished the value of private property.
188. See, e.g., American Land Co. v. City of Keene, 41 F.2d 484, 490
(1st Cir. 1930) (dissenting opinion).
189. 46 N.J. 479, 218 A.2d 129 (1966).
190. Id. at 489, 218 A.2d at 135.
191. Id. at 491-92, 218 A.2d at 137.
192. The court noted:
Plaintiffs failed to adduce proof of any economic use to
which the property could be put. The borough, on the other
hand, adduced unrebutted proof that it would be unsafe to
construct houses oceanward of the building line (apparently
the only use to which lands similarly located in defendant mu-
nicipality have been put), because of the possibility that they
would be destroyed during a severe storm-a result which oc-
curred during the storm of March 1962. Additionally, defendant
submitted proof that there was great peril to life and health
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d. Partical Restriction
Building lines, encroachment lines, floodway limits, buffer
zones, and other types of restrictions which severely restrict con-
struction of structural uses on relatively narrow strips of land
present less critical constitutional problems than similar regula-
tions which restrict development in broader areas, since these
generally affect only a portion of each lot and portions remain
available for construction. The issue is not often raised in zoning
cases because most district boundaries follow roads, alleys, water-
ways, or property lines, and therefore portions of parcels or lots
are rarely placed in separate zones. But the district lines of spe-
cial shoreland districts, wetland areas, floodway or flood fringe
districts, pollution control areas, or scenic protection zones re-
flect natural features and may cross lot lines, streets, or other
such artificial features. If lots or parcels extend some distance
back from a lake, river or stream or are of substantial size, it is
possible that only small portions will be within the building set-
back or other highly restricted area.
If a court chooses to focus on the effect of the regulations on
entire properties rather than on each square foot within special
shoreland district limits, it may discover potentially beneficial
uses. In Gignoux v. Kings Point'9 3 a New York court upheld an
ordinance which required 40,000 square foot minimum lot sizes
for a residential zone containing some low and swampy ground.
The landowner wished to subdivide the property into smaller
lots and claimed the 40,000 square foot minimum was unreason-
able as to the swampy areas. Rather than considering the impact
of the regulations upon the swampy lands, the court took a
broader view and noted that since people would not choose to
build on swampy land, the most advantageous use of the low
land would be to absorb it into plots of larger dimensions.1 9 4
One court has held that where a regulation affects multiple par-
cels, they must be considered together in applying the "denial of
arising through the likely destruction of streets, sewer, water
and gas mains, and electric power lines in the proscribed area
in an ordinary storm. The gist of this testimony was that such
regulation prescribed only such conduct as good husbandry
would dictate that plaintiffs should themselves impose on the
use of their own lands. Consequently, we find that plaintiffs
did not sustain the burden of proving that the ordinance resulted
in a taking of any beneficial economic use of their lands.
Id. at 492, 218 A.2d at 137 (emphasis added).
193. 199 Misc. 485, 99 N.Y.S.2d 280 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
194. Id. at 490, 99 N.Y.S.2d at 285.
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use" test. 95 Generally the suitability of land for a permitted use
under an ordinance should be judged in terms of the proposed
use of the whole land.196 Concentrating on the effect on one
particular parcel distorts the total impact the regulations have
on the landowner.
(1) Building setbacks and official maps
Several groups of cases involve challenges to restrictions im-
posed on portions of lots. These cases contest the constitutional-
ity of setback lines, side yards, rear yards, and official mapping
as applied to specific properties. Each of these devices is used
to maintain small areas free from structural development.
Although the effect of official maps, setback lines, side-yard
requirements, floodway encroachment lines, and setback lines
along lakes may be quite similar-keeping areas free from devel-
opment-the reasons for employing each are different. Official
maps are utilized to prevent construction which may add to con-
demnation costs when a new street is opened or an existing street
is widened.1 97 Apparently this is the only device which has been
judicially approved to achieve this objective.19 8 Attempts to zone
or use setback lines to reduce condemnation costs have some-
times been disapproved. 199
Building setback lines and side-yard requirements have of-
ten been imposed to meet broad public welfare objectives. The
Supreme Court in Gorieb v. Fox2 ° sustained a building ordi-
nance with a street setback of approximately 35 feet intended
195. Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Village of Wflmette, 66 IM. App. 2d
326, 214 N.E.2d 336, 341 (1966).
196. See generally 1 ANDERSON § 2.24, at 108.
197. See generally 3 ANDERSON § 20.02, at 513; Kucirek & Beuscher,
Wisconsin's Official Map Law, 1957 Wis. L. REv. 176.
198. E.g., Headley v. Rochester, 272 N.Y. 197, 5 N.E.2d 198 (1936);
State ex rel. Miller v. Manders, 2 Wis. 2d 365, 86 N.W.2d 469 (1957).
199. See, e.g., Miami v. Romer, 73 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1954) (2d ap-
peal); Gait v. Cook County, 405 ]l. 396, 91 N.E.2d 395 (1950).
200. 274 U.S. 603 (1927) (Court relied on an analogy to side-yard re-
quirements). The Court agreed with the reasons given by the city
for preservation of such front-yards:
[Flront-yards afford room for lawns and trees, keep the dwell-
ings farther from the dust, noise and fumes of the street, add
to the attractiveness and comfort of a residential district, create
a better home environment, and, by securing a greater distance
between houses on opposite sides of the street, reduce the fire
hazard; [and] that the projection of a building beyond the front
line of the adjacent dwellings cuts off light and air from them,
and, by interfering with the view of street corners, constitutes
a danger in the operation of automobiles,
Id. at 609,
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primarily to preserve light and air. The West Virginia Supreme
Court in Welch v. Mitchel 201 stated that 30 foot building setbacks
from the center of a stream could be constitutionally adopted to
preserve flow capacity. Setback regulations have been attacked
on a variety of grounds, including lack of valid police power ob-
jectives20 2 and, most commonly, denial of all reasonable use of a
specific parcel. 203  Often lots subject to setback restrictions are
also subject to side-yard and rear-yard restrictions which are in-
tended to provide open spaces along the margins. Understanda-
bly, if lots are small and setbacks are large, the setbacks may by
themselves, or in combination with the rear-yard and side-yard
requirements, allow little or no building room on the lots. 20 4 Al-
most invariably, a setback is held invalid as applied to a re-
stricted parcel if no buildable space remains on the parcel. This
held true where the useful area of a lot was reduced to 10 square
feet,205 where a property had an effective depth of only 36 feet
because of a 25 foot front-yard and 20 foot rear-yard require-
ment,206 where the restrictions on a corner lot reduced the usual
lot width to about 12 feet,20 7 and where a 90 foot setback limited
the useable width of a lot to one foot on one end of the lot and
eight feet on the other.208  Courts generally look at the entire
property to determine if a reasonable rate of return is possible
despite the restriction. Deep setbacks have been sustained where
the regulated property has been large enough to provide building
space outside of the setback area. Setbacks of 25,209 30,210 50,211
and 60212 feet have been upheld. The United States District
201. 95 W. Va. 377, 121 S.E. 165 (1924).
202. Galt v. Cook County, 405 Ill. 396, 91 N.E.2d 395 (1950).
203. See, e.g., Galt v. Cook County, 405 Ill. 396, 91 N.E.2d 395
(1950); Faucher v. Bldg. Inspector, 321 Mich. 193, 32 N.W.2d 440 (1948);
Oschin v. Redford, 315 Mich. 359, 24 N.W.2d 152 (1946).
204. See, e.g., Galt v. Cook County, 405 Ill. 396, 91 N.E.2d 395
(1950).
205. See Hoshour v. Contra Costa County, 203 Cal. App. 2d 602, 21
Cal. Rptr. 714 (1962).
206. See Oschin v. Tp. of Redford, 315 Mich. 359, 24 N.W.2d 152
(1946).
207. See Faucher v. Bldg. Inspector, 321 Mich. 193, 32 N.W.2d 440
(1948).
208. See Householder v. Grand Island, 36 Misc. 2d 862, 114 N.Y.S.2d
852 (Sup. Ct. 1951), affd, 280 App. Div. 874, 114 N.Y.S.2d 262 (1952),
affd, 305 N.Y. 805, 113 N.E.2d 555 (1953).
209. See Flinn v. Treadwell, 120 Colo. 117, 207 P.2d 967 (1949).
210. See State ex rel. McKusick v. Houghton, 171 Minn. 231, 213
N.W. 907 (1927).
211. See Gitlin v. Rowledge, 36 Misc. 2d 933, 123 N.Y.S.2d 812 (Sup.
Ct. 1953) (50 feet on a lot 150 feet deep).
212. See Sierra Constr. Co. v. Board of App., 12 N.Y.2d 79, 187 N.E.2d
123, 236 N.Y.S.2d 53 (1962).
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Court of Maryland, in upholding the application of several zoning
and official mapping ordinances which restricted 26 per cent of a
lot, noted that the restriction was valid because the plaintiff
had failed to prove that he could not receive "a reasonable return
from a building constructed on the unrestricted area alone."213
(2) Minimum lot sizes
Large lot sizes can be used to achieve a variety of open space
objectives. First, they indirectly reduce the area which will be
placed in pavement, concrete, buildings, and other impermeable
surfaces at the expense of natural cover.214 Second, they protect
health and safety in areas lacking public water supply and waste
disposal by providing room for safely spaced onsite facilities.2 15
213. Symonds v. Bucklin, 197 F. Supp. 682, 686 (D. Md. 1961).
214. Large lot sizes alone cannot assure that an area will not be
paved or placed entirely in building development. However, a
combination of large lot sizes and a maximum percentage requirement
for buildings or paving could effectively assure this objective.
215. Near-surface ground water and impermeable soils are com-
monly found in wetlands, flood plains, and other shoreland areas.
These may prevent the proper functioning of on-site waste disposal
systems. Improperly operating systems located too near wells may re-
sult in health hazards. Large lot sizes help assure that adequate dis-
tances will be provided between wells and on-site waste disposal fa-
cilities.
In Zygmont v. Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 152 Conn. 550, 210
A.2d 172 (1965), the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors emphasized
the importance of adequate waste disposal capabilities for a site to pre-
vent water pollution and prevent health hazards. The court held that
denial of plaintiff's application for change of zoning from a four acre
single residential to a 20,000 square foot single residential classification
was justified and not arbitrary or an abuse of discretion. Four to
five acres of the 13 acres of plaintiff's parcel were swampy and covered
by silt-a situation commonly found on the flood plain or swamp areas.
In order to develop the lot, the swamp needed to be drained and the
ground level raised five feet.
Referring to plaintiffs proposal to develop the area into lots of
20,000 square feet each, the court stated, "[o]n its face, the plan is im-
practical." Id. at 553, 210 A.2d at 174. There was evidence that the
southern portion could not be economically developed. Further, there
was evidence that on-site wells and sewage disposal systems pre-
sented a definite public health question. A Greenwich Sanitary Code
provided that no well be placed within 75 feet of a sewage drainage
field. The court was apparently concerned that the 20,000 foot mini-
mum lot sizes would not allow sufficient separation distances between
the wells and sewage drainage fields. It noted that under the proposed
plan there could be only one possible location for the necessary well on
each lot. Id. at 554, 210 A.2d at 174.
The same court in Corsino v. Grover, 148 Conn. 299, 170 A.2d 267
(1961) upheld a 10,000 square foot minimum for lot sizes in a shore-
front area in Old Lyme. The court noted:
Even if diminutive lots would make possible the greatest use
1972]
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Third, large minimum lot sizes provide adequate building room
in an area of variable topography where only a portion of each
lot is subject to stringent zoning restrictions or contains flooding
threats, high ground water, steep slopes, or unique scenic or wild-
life values such as fish-spawning or duck-nesting grounds.21 0
which could be made of the plaintiffs land for shore cottages,
with possible future year-round use, the commission could rea-
sonably decide, on the ground of lack of adequate water
supply and sewage facilities, let alone other dangerous condi-
tions which could result from congested housing, that the plain-
tiff's proposed use would be inimical to the public welfare.
Id. at 312-13, 170 A.2d at 273.
216. Arguments can be made that where land, because of natural
limitations, is partially unsuitable for development, it should be classi-
fied in large enough lot sizes so that some space suitable for building
sites may be available. For example, the New York Court in Gignoux
v. Kings Point, 199 Misc. 485, 99 N.Y.S.2d 280, 285 (Sup. Ct. 1950), noted
that the "best possible use . . . [of marshy area] would be in connection
with its absorption into plots of larger dimensions."
In Honeck v. Cook County, 12 Ill. 2d 257, 260, 146 N.E.2d 35, 37
(1957), the Illinois Supreme Court upheld a five acre minimum resi-
dential lot size for land that was "hilly, rolling, and full of ravines."
The case was decided partially on the ground that this land was not
suited for the more intense development which the landowner contem-
plated.
While some courts have agreed that natural limitations on lots may
justify large minimum lot sizes, other decisions have held that if these
natural limitations must be overcome by expensive improvements be-
fore development can occur, small lots which offer a higher rate of re-
turn are needed. See, e.g., La Salle Nat'l Bank v. Highland Park,
27 Ill. 2d 350, 189 N.E.2d 302 (1963). The crucial factor is whether large
lot sizes prevent economic use of land. Costs of improvement are one
consideration.
Large lots may contain both undevelopable marshland and steep
slope areas and also some suitable building sites on upland areas.
Smaller lots lacking upland areas might require expensive reclamation.
The Court of Appeals of Ohio in State ex rel. Grant v. Kiefaber, 114
Ohio App. 279, 181 N.E.2d 905 (1960), aff'd, 171 Ohio St. 326, 170
N.E.2d 848 (1960), upheld the reasonableness of a residential zoning
classification, as applied to plaintiff's land, which required 80,000 square
foot minimum lot sizes for land that included some areas subject to
flooding. The plaintiff wished to subdivide his property in 20,000
square foot residential lots. A creek, subject to occasional flooding,
bisected the 350 acre proposed subdivision. One section of the plan-
ning commission's regulations provided that the commission should not
approve any subdivision in an area subject to periodic flooding un-
less the developer agreed to perform necessary improvements to render
the area safe for residential use.
The court noted that the requirement that the lands be made safe
from flood hazards prior to subdivision
poses an additional serious problem confronting relator incident
to subdividing his property into half-acre lots, and in our
opinion substantially detracts from the profit which relator
contends would inure to him as a result of being permitted to
subdivide his farm into half-acre lots.
Id. at 289, 181 N.E.2d at 912-13 (emphasis added).
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Fourth, large minimum lot sizes can reduce the effect of develop-
ment upon the natural scenery. 21T Although large minimum
lot sizes alone may not be sufficient to maintain natural beauty,
they can be important if combined with restrictions on filling and
grazing, setbacks from shoreline, maximum building area require-
ments,218 and minimum flood area requirements. 21 9
The court held that the plaintiff had not shown that the regulations
were arbitrary, unreasonable, or confiscatory.
217. One of the most significant cases dealing with large lot zoning
of shoreland property to preserve amenity is County Comm'rs v.
Miles, 246 Md. 355, 228 A.2d 450 (1967), decided by the Maryland
Court of Appeals. The court sustained a residential five acre minimum
lot size classification for three high quality waterfront districts which
consisted of 50 properties with an average area of 320 acres, com-
prising 6.7% of the land area of the county and 29.80% of the total
water frontage. The court reviewed a large number of significant mini-
mum lot sizes cases and noted that the results of the cases "turn on the
various economic, physical and sociological factors involved in the par-
ticular case." Id at 368-69, 228 A.2d at 457. The court felt that in
light of these factors the five acre minimum was not unreasonable.
While minimum lot sizes may be helpful in preserving natural
beauty, several courts have disapproved large minimum lot sizes based
primarily upon aesthetic objectives. See, e.g., Hitchman v. Okland Tp.,
329 Mich. 331, 45 N.W.2d 306 (1951); but see Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Bd. of
Adj., 393 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851 (1958). A New York court disapproved
large lot sizes for a high value shoreland area not because aesthetic
protection was an invalid objective but because the court did not
feel that aesthetic considerations justified severe restrictions which
substantially reduced land values. Bismark v. Bayville, 49 Misc. 2d
604, 267 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
218. See generally Amnot., 27 A.L.R. 443 (1923).
219. Minimum floor area requirements in combination with mini-
mum lot sizes might help protect the quality of shoreland areas since
larger and higher quality structures appear, within limits, to be more
compatible with a high quality environment than small, single-room
shacks which are often poorly maintained. The New Jersey Supreme
Court in a controversial case, Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Wayne Tp.,
10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952), sustained a rural zoning ordinance
fixing minimum size of dwellings. For a discussion see Harr, Zoning
for Minimum Standards: The Wayne Township Case, 66 HARv. L REV.
1051 (1953). A considerable number of residences in the area had
been built for seasonal occupancy. The ordinance required that a one
story dwelling have at least 768 square feet living floor space and a
two story dwelling have at least 1,000 square feet if accompanied by an
attached garage, and 1,200 square feet if not. Despite arguments that a
dwelling house for year round occupancy would cost $10,000 to $12,000
and would be financially out of the reach of 70% of the population, the
court sustained the regulations with the following rationale, which
may be applicable to regulations for many rural recreation areas:
The Township of Wayne is still for the most part a sparsely
settled countryside with great natural attractions in its lakes,
hills and streams, but obviously it lies in the path of the next
onward wave of suburban development.... It requires as
much official watchfulness to anticipate and prevent suburban
blight as it does to eradicate city slums.
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The precedent behind official mapping laws and setback pro-
visions lend support to tight restrictions placed only upon por-
tions of lots. Zoning regulations requiring a minimum lot size
area are authorized by most zoning enabling acts. 22 0  Although
such large lot zoning often results in financial hardship to land-
owners, large minimum lot sizes have been widely approved.22 1
The reason for such approval may lie in 'the fact that such re-
strictions are enacted to achieve a wide variety of objectives
which defy precise valuation. A court is in a difficult position to
evaluate the benefit of a lot size classification enacted to achieve
a variety of objectives including allocation of lands to most
Id. at 173, 89 A.2d at 697.
The court further explained its holding:
If some such requirements [minimum living floor space] were
not imposed there would be grave danger in certain parts of the
township, particularly around the lakes which attract summer
visitors, of the erection of shanties which would deteriorate
land values generally to the great detriment of the increasing
number of people who live in Wayne Township the year round.
The minimum floor area requirements imposed by the ordi-
nance are not large for a family of normal size. Without some
such restrictions there is always the danger that after some
homes have been erected giving a character to a neighborhood
others might follow which would fail to live up to the standards
thus voluntarily set. This has been the experience in many com-
munities and it is against this that the township has sought
to safeguard itself within limits which seem to us to be alto-
gether reasonable.
220. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 59.97(4) (j) (1967), which provides that
ordinances may regulate "the density and distribution of population."
221. See 1 A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING, ch.
34, § 2, at 34-7, nn. 12-13 (3rd ed. 1962, Supp. 1971); 2 C. YOKLEY,
ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE, § 17-11 n.60 (3rd ed. 1965, Supp. 1971); 2
ANDERSON § 8.47, at 48-49. The following are a few of the many
cases upholding large minimum lot sizes: One acre minimum upheld:
Simon v. Town of Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516 (1942); Har-
rison Ridge Associates Corp. v. Sforza, 6 App. Div. 2d 1051, 179 N.Y.S.2d
547 (1958); Gignoux v. Kings Point, 199 Misc. 485, 99 N.Y.S.2d 280
(Sup. Ct. 1950); Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Bd. of Adj., 393 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d
851 (1958). Two acre minimum: Young v. Town Planning & Zoning
Comm'n, 151 Conn. 235, 196 A.2d 427 (1963); Levitt v. Sands Point,
6 N.Y.2d 269, 160 N.E.2d 501, 189 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1959). Three acre
minimum: Flora Realty & Inv. Co. v. City of Ladue, 362 Mo. 1025,
246 S.W.2d 771 (1952), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 802 (1952). Four acre
minimum: Senior v. Zoning Comm'n, 146 Conn. 531, 153 A.2d 415
(1959). Five acre minimum: Honeck v. Cook County, 12 Ill. 2d 257,
146 N.E.2d 35 (1957); Fischer v. Bedminster Tp., 11 N.J. 194, 93 A.2d
378 (1952). But see Aronson v. Town of Sharon, 346 Mass. 598, 195
N.E.2d 341 (1964); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Bd. of Adj., 419 Pa. 504,
215 A.2d 597 (1965); Bd. of County Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653,
107 S.E.2d 390 (1959). See also, e.g., Marquette Nat. Bank v. Cook
County, 24 Ill. 2d 497, 182 N.E.2d 147 (1962); State ex rel. Rice v. Village
of Woodmere, 172 Ohio St. 359, 176 N.E.2d 421 (1961).
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suitable uses,2 22 regulation of population density, provision for
light and air, reduction of congestion, preservation of proper-
ty values, and protection of wildlife. Only rarely do large lot
sizes prevent all economic use of the land. In Aronon v. Town
of Sharon 223 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts inval-
idated lot size requirements for a single-family residential dis-
trict requiring 100,000 square feet minimum lot sizes and lot
width of 200 feet. The area was wooded, quite rocky, wet, and
had some steep grades. Although the court conceded advantages
in large lot sizes, it noted that at some point the law of diminish-
ing returns sets in and lot sizes become excessive. While large
minimum lot sizes may be used to maintain low density develop-
ment in an area, low density increases the cost of roads, sewer
and water for each lot.
A better approach than large lot size requirements is to en-
courage intense development of some areas and preserve others
in a wholly natural state. The problem with such an approach
is that the owners of smaller parcels in the stringently regulated
areas may have no practical uses for their lands. However, if
open space areas are in large parcel ownership, use of "cluster"
subdivisions may provide both intensely developed areas and
open areas within one ownership unit..2 24
IV. EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. EVALUATION
A moderate number of cases have considered the validity of
regulations allocating lands to low density or open space uses.
These decisions somewhat clarify the twilight zone between valid
222. For an excellent discussion of the importance of natural fea-
tures to the validity of a zoning classification see Bogert v. Washing-
ton Tp., 25 N.J. 57, 135 A.2d 1 (1957), in which the court sustained a one
acre minimum lot size for an undeveloped area with steep terrain.
The court noted:
There are many considerations which may validly apply
to influence the way property in a district may be classified.
Important among these are the prior existing uses in the dis-
trict, the natural contours and topographical features of the
land, in some instances the geological strata of the land with
particular relation to the effect of drainage and seepage upon
water and sewage problems.
Id. at 61-62, 135 A.2d at 3.
223. 346 Mass. 598, 195 N.E.2d 341 (1964).
224. Cluster subdivisions place multi-family units around com-
monly owned open spaces. For articles relating to cluster subdivisions
and other planned unit developments see Kusler, Artificial Lakes and
Land Subdivisions, 1971 Wis. L. REv. 368, 407-08 nn.137-38.
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police power regulations and unconstitutional confiscation.
There is some reasoning in the group of cases as a whole to sug-
gest that courts are now more receptive to more severe land use
restrictions to achieve public objectives than they were twenty
years ago.2 25 But the "taking" question is by no means a dead
issue.
In conclusion, cases considering the confiscation issue reveal
some broad principles:
1. Courts are highly receptive to regulations which prevent
land uses which threaten public safety or pose nuisance threats
to other lands. While courts are now more willing to sustain
regulations which protect aesthetics and other broad public wel-
fare objectives, they have not yet sustained severe restrictions to
serve these objectives.
2. A more substantial relationship between regulations and
the regulatory objectives is required when land uses and values
are considerably diminished. For example, stringent regulation
of land uses in floodway areas adjacent to a stream channel may
be justified to reduce flood losses since single uses may substan-
tially block flood flows and discharge water onto other lands.
However, absolute prohibition of uses in outer flood plain areas
with minor flood threats may not be justified to preserve flood
storage and reduce flood losses.
3. Since the constitutional proscription against uncompen-
sated taking exists not only to protect property rights against
uncompensated interference but to prevent arbitrary or discrim-
inatory governmental action, discrimination is a major considera-
tion. If the government pays in one instance for a park, flood
storage area, or game preserve but attempts in a second instance
to achieve the identical use and benefits through regulation with-
out compensation, a finding of taking as well as discrimination is
inevitable. There is far less judicial concern with severe bur-
dens upon private land use where all similarly situated individ-
uals are treated equally. Courts have often disapproved regula-
tions designed to allocate lands to public or quasi-public uses
which ordinarily involve public purchase rather than regula-
225. Courts are clearly more receptive to stringent regulations than
in the 1920's. Courts have with some reluctance gradually come to
accept broader police power objectives such as protection of aesthetic
values. See discussion accompanying notes 93-98 supra. However, thejudicial trend to accept more stringent regulations has apparently
slowed since the early 1950's.
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tion; courts have almost invariably disapproved physical use of
private lands for a public purpose.
4. In the balancing process, courts are sensitive to regula-
tory benefits and burdens. Courts generally support regulations
which involve a reciprocity of benefit and burdens although the
benefits may not always be equal to the burdens. While invari-
ably there is support for regulations which prevent the nuisance
use of lands, open space regulations which impose serious bur-
dens without compensating benefits are held unconstitutional.
The prohibition of development on one parcel of land to protect
the scenery when viewed from an adjacent private development
or public road may impose substantial private burdens and yet
yield little compensating benefit. The adjacent private develop-
ment or road destroys the reciprocal view from the regulated
parcel and prohibition of all development may prevent all of the
landowner uses which might be benefitted by the view. Many
open space regulations such as flood plain zoning, building set-
backs, and grazing districts do, in fact, involve reciprocity of bene-
fits and burdens.
5. Courts simultaneously apply many tests in determining
the issue of taking. While diminution in value is relevant to the
question of taking, it is not usually considered determinative.
Rather, courts are focusing with increasing sophistication on a
less subjective test-whether regulations deny all economic use
of property. Regulations are usually found invalid if it is shown
that absent the regulations there will be economic uses which do
not threaten other lands or the public.
6. Regulations affecting swamps, steep slopes, erosion areas
and flood hazard areas may be invalidated if the permitted uses
are not sufficiently remunerative to allow economic reclamation
of the lands. These are the most difficult cases to accept from a
planning viewpoint. Costs of improvement for lands unsuitable
for development due to flooding threats, high groundwater, ero-
sion, or steep slopes, are considered relevant to the question
of reasonable use. In some instances only small lot industrial or
commercial uses will economically justify reclamation. These
uses may make no sense in terms of broader community plan-
ning and may result in use of lands for their most inappropriate
economic uses since roads, sewers, water and other facilities are
particularly expensive for these areas. Recreational use is much
more sensible.
7. Courts are less concerned with diminution in value where
land is purchased with knowledge of restrictions. The cases de-
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nying relief on grounds of self-created hardship are most inter-
esting because in the usual zoning context self-created hardship
is generally not considered to estop constitutional attacks. 220 De-
spite a showing of no economic use in light of the purchase costs,
no taking is found. Hopefully this reflects a growing refusal by
courts to recognize speculative value as a necessary considera-
tion.227 As cities gradually expand and open land grows scarce,
skyrocketing land values are inevitable. Little land near urban
areas may be economically suited for open space uses if unre-
stricted sale value is the determinative consideration. Courts
would go far in aiding community planning by refusing to rec-
ognize a right to continued increases in land value and by bas-
ing their taking analysis upon a denial of all reasonable use
rather than upon diminution in potential development value.
No single court test for taking provides a wholly satisfactory
standard for gauging whether compensation is or is not due a
landowner. The weighing of private and public harm in each
case is perhaps the most satisfactory approach since many com-
peting equities are taken into consideration. But this weighing
process is difficult to quantify or embody in an objective stand-
ard. A single test would simplify judicial evaluation and aid
government and landowners in determining when compensation
is or is not due. On the other hand, a single test might work in-
justice when applied to a wide range of diverse situations. De-
spite common criticism of the courts for reaching seemingly in-
consistent results in the taking cases, this study found a consid-
erable degree of logical consistency in the cases where all factors
were taken into account.
Existing precedent interpreting federal and state constitu-
tional guarantees against taking property offers little hope that
courts will suddenly begin to endorse impossible restrictions.
Unfortunately, the number of cases adverse to the employment
of land use controls for protection of scenic beauty and wildlife
is likely to increase due to lack of sophistication in the drafting
of open space regulations. Regulatory approaches are less likely
226. See 1 A-NDERSON § 2.30 at 121, citing Bright v. Evanston, 57
Ill. App. 2d 414, 206 N.E.2d 765 (1965). But purchase with knowledge
of restrictions is often given some weight. Id. § 2.30 at 122 and cases
cited therein.
227. In certain circumstances, of course, inequity can result from
refusal to recognize speculative value. This is particularly true if the
landowner has given purchase price consideration for development
value or has paid substantial taxes on land value which includes de-
velopment value.
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subject to constitutional attack if they simultaneously permit
private landowners some economic uses for their lands and yet
considerably restrict uses in order to achieve public objectives.
The key to constitutionality appears to be in this balance.
B. INNOVATIVE APPROACHES
There are several approaches available which would both in-
crease the likelihood of constitutionally valid regulations and in-
sure a more complete consideration of competing equities. The
first of these, modifications in ordinances, would not require new
legislation but could be implemented through an effort by local
planners, lawyers, and councilmen to provide more flexibility in
open space zoning ordinances. The second, a statutory test for
taking, would require new legislation. The third, permitting
preferential real estate tax assessment for open space lands,
would require new legislation and in some states a constitutional
amendment. The fourth, regulations in conjunction with com-
pensation or purchase, would require new legislation and a
source of substantial public funding.
1. Ordinances with Special Exception Permits
The drafters of open space zoning regulations often have not
made sincere attempts to provide economic private land uses.228
In a situation where open space uses such as agriculture or for-
estry are not economic, single-family residences should be added
as carefully controlled special exceptions to the list of open space
uses permitted by an ordinance. Although this would be less
than ideal if residences were not desired in an area, some con-
cession to private property rights is justified to preserve consti-
tutionality. An ordinance might establish requirements for resi-
dences to minimize adverse impact including (1) large minimum
lot size requirements (perhaps three to five acres), (2) maxi-
mum percentage of the lot occupied by the building, parking area
and roads, (3) building setbacks from roads and water, (4)
height restrictions and perhaps architectural controls for areas of
special scenic beauty, (5) a showing that safe water supply and
waste disposal can be provided, (6) construction with protection
against flooding and other natural threats, and (7) siting of the
building and the use of plantings and screenings to protect wild-
life and natural beauty.
228. This observation is based upon the author's examination of
several hundred open space zoning regulations and discussions with
many planners.
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Landowners might be required to show economic hardship
like that required for a special building permit under official
mapping laws. 229 These could include a showing that he could
not earn a fair rate of return on his entire property and he would
be damaged by placing his building or use outside the protected
area.23 0  The hardship requirements for issuance of this special
exception would resemble those for a zoning variance.2 3' 1 How-
ever, the special exception would not contravene the ordinance
as would a similar "use" variance.232 In addition, the landowner
would not need to show uniqueness in his situation, as he would
for the granting of a more traditional "variance. 2 3 .
Courts would not be faced with regulations which per se
prevent all development.234 Courts have generally been unsym-
pathetic to regulations which prevent use of land for dwelling
purposes. Residential uses located in zones designed to protect
229. Official map statutes focus upon the problem of denying all
reasonable use of land. E.g., Wis. STAT. § 62.23 (6) (d) (1967). A land-
owner may request permission from a zoning board of adjustment to
construct a building in the bed of a mapped street. The board may
grant permission if the landowner can show he will be substantially
damaged by placing his building outside the mapped street, that the
land within the mapped area is not earning a fair rate of return, and
that the building will "as little as practicable increase the cost of open-
ing such street ... or tend to cause a change of such official map ... "
The board "may impose reasonable requirements as a condition of grant-
ing such permit, which requirements shall be designated to promote the
health, convenience, safety, or general welfare of the community."
230. Id.
231. See generally discussion of variances in 2 ANDERSON, ch. 14
and 3 ANDERSON, ch. 14. The classic requirements for a variance are
stated in Otto v. Steinhilber, 282 N.Y. 71, 76, 24 N.E.2d 851, 853 (1939):
Before the Board may exercise its discretion and grant a vari-
ance upon the ground of unnecessary hardship, the record must
show that (1) the land in question cannot yield a reasonable
return if used only for a purpose allowed in that zone; (2) that
the plight of the owner is due to unique circumstances and not
to the general conditions in the neighborhood which may re-
flect the unreasonableness of the zoning ordinance itself; and
(3) that the use to be authorized by the variance will not alter
the essential character of the locality. (emphasis added)
232. A "use" variance permits a use, such as an industrial use, in a
zone where the use is not allowed by the ordinance. Courts often ob-
ject to or examine critically the issuance of use variances. See gener-
ally 3 ANDERSON § 14.68 to 57 et seq. and cases cited therein.
233. See 2 ANDERSON § 14.32 at 669 and cases cited therein. See,
e.g., Murphy, Inc. v. Bd. of Zoning App., 147 Conn. 358, 161 A.2d 185
(1960); Bd. of Adj. v. Kremer, 139 So. 2d 448 (Fla. App. 1962).
234. The regulations litigated in Morris County Land Improvement
Co. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Tp., 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963), pro-
hibited on their face almost all development. The court found the
conservancy district regulations unconstitutional in toto. See notes
144-49 supra and accompanying text.
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special scenery, wildlife, or so forth might be said to benefit
from the special amenity of the area,23 5 a benefit that could hard-
ly be argued to accrue to open land. The special permit ap-
proach has met with judicial favor..2 30  The device provides
greater assurance to landowners that their economic plight will
be taken into account and provides planners and administrators
with some standard whereby the economic effect on the land-
owner would be a real factor in planning and administration.
The Maryland courts have several times sustained similar strin-
gent requirements for special exceptions under the zoning regu-
lations for the city of Baltimore.237
In some areas, of course, open space uses such as agriculture
and forestry will be economic, and provision for single-family
residences will not be required to preserve constitutionality.
This will be the case for many rural lands where land values and
taxes are low. In other areas such as floodways, steep slopes, or
areas with inadequate soils for onsite waste disposal, single fam-
ily residences will be clearly inappropriate due to special hazards
or problems. Here courts may be receptive to arguments that
structural uses should be prohibited because they are nuisance-
like or are unreasonable in that they threaten the safety of the
user, his guests or a purchaser. But in other instances where all
structural development must be prohibited to meet planning
goals, and property taxes are high, effective regulations will
likely be held unconstitutional. Tax incentives in combination
with regulations, compensable regulations, or public purchase of
easement or fee interests seem appropriate.
2. A Statutory Test for "Taking"
Severe restrictions with explicit review procedures for ag-
grieved landowners combined with a statutory test for "taking"
should receive judicial favor.2 38 A statutory amendment to zon-
235. See, e.g., Simon v. Town of Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d
516 (1942), discussed in note 85 supra.
236. See, e.g., Vartelas v. Water Resources Comm'n, 146 Conn. 650,
153 A.2d 822 (1959), discussed in note 27 supra.
237. See Mayor v. Polakoff, 233 Md. 1, 194 A.2d 819 (1963); Heath
v. Mayor, 190 Md. 478, 58 A.2d 896 (1948).
238. Courts appear more willing to sanction stringent regulations of
property where express provision is made for administrative or judi-
cial review to protect property interests. E.g., the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, in Miller v. Manders, 2 Wis. 2d 365, 86 N.W.2d 469 (1957), upheld
an official mapping law which authorized municipalities to prohibit
most structures in the beds of mapped streets. In upholding the law,
the court stressed the importance of a variance procedure which per-
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ing enabling acts could provide statutory criteria for taking
which would codify usual court tests for determining a taking.
It could also provide that any landowner could appeal to a court
for relief from the restrictions if the court found the restrictions
unreasonable in that (1) the uses permitted by the ordinance,
including "special exception" uses, would not offer a fair rate of
return on petitioner's whole property, or (2) the petitioner had
been denied permission for all practical uses, or (3) the owner
would be damaged by placing his building or use outside the
special protection area, or (4) the proposed use would not have
nuisance-like effect or threaten the health and safety of the pub-
lic, the landowner, his guests, or purchasers, or (5) the proposed
use would offer economic return and would be conducted in a
manner which would minimally detract from the statutory ob-
jectives. In the event of a finding of unreasonableness, the local
unit would have 30 days in which to make an exception which
would permit an economic use to the satisfaction of the court.
Such legislative tests for "taking" are given considerable defer-
ence by a court but are not considered conclusive. 239
mitted a landowner to appeal to a board of appeals for a building per-
mit if the landowner was substantially damaged by the map re-
strictions. The court noted that "[w]ithout such a saving clause it is
extremely doubtful if an Official Map Statute would be constitutional."
Id. at 372, 86 N.W.2d at 473. The court also stressed the availability of
court review if a permit was denied.
239. The deference courts accord to legislative constructions of con-
stitutional provisions varies among the jurisdictions. In Wilson v. City
of High Point, 238 N.C. 14, 20, 76 S.E.2d 546, 550 (1953), the court stated
that "[t]he legislative construction of the Constitution is entitled to
great weight, but it is not binding upon the Court." The Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia, in Harrison v. Barkesdale, 127 Va. 180,
207, 102 S.E. 789, 798 (1920), expressed a similar viewpoint:
While [a legislative construction of a constitutional provision]
would be entitled to great consideration and respect, we can-
not consider it as controlling upon us. The judicial department
of the government is especially charged with responsibility of
construing the constitutional provision in question ......
Other courts have more jealously guarded their powers in interpreting
constitutional provisions. E.g., in Parkin Printing & Stationery Co. v.
Arkansas Printing & Lithographing Co., 234 Ark. 697, 706, 354 S.W.2d
560, 565 (1962), the court stated that:
It is the duty of the Judicial Department to interpret the con-
stitution, and we cannot abrogate our duty by adopting inter-
pretations made by either of the other Departments in conflict
with plain language. Legislative and/or Executive interpreta-
tions are to be given consideration only when the Constitu-
tional provision is ambiguous ....
The Supreme Court of South Dakota also expressed unwillingness to
defer to legislative constructions except in limited cases:
[Ilt is not within the proper functions of a legislative body to
define a term that may be used in a Constitution; and, if we
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English land use controls presently incorporate such a statu-
tory test. Compensation must be paid if planning regulations
render property "incapable of reasonably beneficial use."240  A
Massachusetts statute241 for preservation of coastal wetlands
provides that a landowner affected by a special order regulating
a coastal wetland may petition a court for relief within 90 days
if "such order so restricts the use of his property as to deprive
him of the practical uses thereof and is therefore an unreason-
able exercise of the police power because the order constitutes
were to consider the use of the term "public securities" in sec-
tion 2055, PoL Code, as merely an effort to define "property"
such definition of the term would be entitled to no weight un-
less it appeared that it was of such long standing and had been
so generally accepted and acted upon as to show an approval
thereof by the people....
National Surety Co. v. Starkey, 41 S.D. 356, 360, 170 N.W. 582, 583
(1919).
240. Section 19 of the 1947 Act authorizes landowners to serve "pur-
chase notices" on local authorities if they allege that their land, because
of a denial of planning permission, "has become incapable of reasonably
beneficial use in its existing state." Town and Country Planning Act
of 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 51, § 19.
Reenacted in the 1962 Act as § 129, the section provides that a
landowner may serve a purchase notice under the following condi-
tions, Town and Country Planning Act of 1962, 10 & 11 Eliz. 2, c. 38,
§ 129(a)-(c):
(1) Where, on an application for planning permission to de-
velop any land, permission is refused or is granted sub-ject to conditions, then if any owner of the land claims-(a) that the land has become incapable of reasonably
beneficial use in its existing state, and
(b) in a case where planning condition was granted
subject to conditions, that the land cannot be rendered
capable of reasonably beneficial use by the carrying
out of the permitted development in accordance with
those conditions, and
(c) in any case, that the land cannot be rendered capable
of reasonably beneficial use by the carrying out of
any other development for which planning permission
has been granted or for which the local planning au-
thority or the Minister has undertaken to grant plan-
ning permission.
While the language seems to state a test resembling the "denial
of all reasonable use" test of the American courts, a second provision
qualifies the first section by providing that if any question arises as
to what would:
[i]n any particular circumstances be a reasonably beneficial
use of that land, then, in determining that question for that
purpose, no account shall be taken of any prospective use of
that land which would involve the carrying out of new develop-
ment.
Id., § 129(2). This qualification creates confusion and limits appli-
cability of the test. If new development cannot be considered, then the
question would seem to be simply whether previously existing use value
had been destroyed.
241. MAss. A~x. LAws ch. 130, § 105 (1972).
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the equivalent of a taking without compensation. 2 4 2  Mary-
land 243 and Rhode Island244 have adopted similar acts for protec-
tion of coastal wetlands. These acts provide for court review
within a specified period of time based on a denial of practical
use or property damage test.245  While this statutory deadline
for administrative or judicial review may be desirable in defining
respective rights and minimizing later responsibility of the state,
the effectiveness of final administrative review,2 40 or the consti-
tutionality of a deadline for court review is questionable.2 47
242. Id.
243. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, §§ 718-30 (1970 and Supp. 1971).
244. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 2-1-13 to 24 (Supp. 1971).
245. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 725 (1970) provides that if the
landowner
is dissatisfied with the decision of the board, he may, within
thirty days after receiving notice thereof, petition the circuit
court in the county in which the land is located to determine
whether such rules or regulations so restrict the use of his
property as to deprive him of the practical uses thereof and
are therefore an unreasonable exercise of the police power, be-
cause the order constitutes the equivalent of a taking without
compensation....
R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 2-1-16 (Supp. 1971) provides that "[i]f by the
adoption of an order under the preceding section any owner of the land
subject to such order suffers damage, such owner may recover compen-
sation for such damage in an action filed in the superior court within
two (2) years from the date of recording of such order. . ....
246. Courts have sometimes insisted upon judicial review of admin-
istrative action even when statutes have provided that administrative
action is final or that it shall not be reviewed. See, e.g., Rudges v.
Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945); Blanchard Mach. Co. v. RFC Price Adj. Bd.,
177 F.2d 727, cert. denied, 339 U.S. 912 (1949).
The Supreme Court noted in Monongahola Bridge Co. v. United
States, 216 U.S. 177, 195 (1910), that
the courts have rarely, if ever, felt themselves so restrained by
technical rules that they could not find some remedy, consistent
with the law, for acts, whether done by government or by in-
dividual persons, that violated natural justice or were hostile
to the fundamental principles devised for the protection of the
essential rights of property.
Courts have been particularly insistent upon judicial review when
constitutional rights are involved. See, e.g., Ludecke v. Watkins, 335
U.S. 160 (1948); State v. Finch, 79 Idaho 275, 315 P.2d 529 (1957).
247. A judicial determination of taking depends upon the circum-
stances existing at a point in time including practical uses for land, land
values, taxes and other factors. The cultivation of marsh hay may be
an economic use for a rural wetland with low land values and low rates
of taxation. But as a city expands into surrounding areas, farming or
forestry uses may become impractical with increased land values and
taxation. Courts in zoning cases have recognized that the reasonable-
ness of particular regulations applied to a parcel may vary over time
as surrounding circumstances change. See 1 ANDnsoN § 2.12 at 59,
citing Louisville Timber and Wooden Products Co. v. Beechwood Village,
376 S.W.2d 690 (Ky. 1964); Leutenmayer v. Mathis, 333 S.W.2d 774
(Ky. Ct. App. 1959). Similarly, what is not in fact a taking at one point
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An act like the one suggested herein which would allow the
owner to contest regulations which deny all economic use of land
would force planners to be aware of the limitations on the police
power. Of course a legislative standard incorporating a denial of
all "economic uses" test of the sort proposed can be criticized
from several points of view. First, the standard is necessarily
ambiguous. Although the standard is phrased in terms of "eco-
nomic" use, which is somewhat more explicit than "denial of all
reasonable use," which might be interpreted to mean any possible
use rather than any profitable use, economic use may connote
the original price of the property, the resale value, the cost of
may become a taking at a later date. Any attempt to make a final de-
termination as of a specific point in time would fail to recognize chang-
ing conditions.
The Supreme Court, in United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745(1946), stressed the importance of changing conditions in the determi-
nation of taking. In this case the court considered the application of a
federal statute authorizing property owners to bring suit against the
federal government to recover the value of property taken within six
years of the date of taking. The property owners had initiated a com-
pensation suit for flood and erosion damage caused by construction of
a federal dam more than six years after the original flooding. The
Court held that the statute could not cut off rights prematurely. It
noted that "[tihe Fifth Amendment expresses a principle of fairness and
not a technical rule of procedure enshrining old or new niceties re-
garding 'causes of action'-when they are born, whether they prolifer-
ate, and when they die." Id. at 748. The Court noted that flood and
erosion damage would be a continuing process and stated:
An owner of land flooded by the Government would not un-
naturally postpone bringing a suit against the Government for
the flooding until the consequences of inundation have so mani-
fested themselves that a final account may be struck.
When dealing with a problem which arises under such di-
verse circumstances procedural rigidities should be avoided.
All that we are here holding is that when the Government
chooses not to condemn land but to bring about a taking by a
continuing process of physical events, the owner is not required
to resort either to piecemeal or to premature litigation to ascer-
tain the just compensation for what is really "taken."
Id. at 749.
Courts might adopt a similar approach to attempts to terminatejudicial review of the taking issue after a brief period of time as pro-
vided by wetland preservation statutes. Courts might simply refuse to
abide by the review deadlines. 4 K. DAVIs, ADmnasarEAI LAW TRn-
TISE § 28.18 (1958), in analyzing the question whether due process of
law requires opportunity for judicial review of issues of law in ad-
ministrative action, concluded at 93-94 that
The Court's technique for leaving the constitutional question
open is simply to review to the extent that the Constitution
might require review, no matter how clear the statute may be
in cutting off review. The somewhat surprising result is that,
except for three cases requiring independent judicial deter-
mination of both law and fact, not a single Supreme Court case
holds a statute unconstitutional on the ground that judicial
review is denied or restricted.
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improvements, or the annual income as compared with expenses.
While a statute could spell out all factors to be taken into ac-
count and thereby reduce ambiguity, it seems advisable to leave
the economic use determination somewhat flexible to be worked
out on a case by case basis.
Second, a test which evaluates all development in economic
terms may force a court to approve an unsound or dangerous
development where all practical uses constitute nuisances. For
example, structural uses and filling in a floodway will back up
water and cause damage. The economic use test should be qual-
ified by a proviso that uses with nuisance-like effects are not to
be taken into account. A similar qualification is necessary for
self-induced hardship-purchase with knowledge of the restric-
tion.
A third objection to such a test is that it reflects only the
availability of minimal economic return and not the actual dam-
age to the landowner. Although the test may be difficult to de-
fend philosophically, many recent cases do not in fact focus upon
the amount of diminution but rather upon the impact the regu-
lations have upon all economic uses.
3. Regulations in Conjunction with' Tax Adjustments
In invalidating specific severe zoning restrictions as uncon-
stitutionally "taking" private property, courts have quite often
noted that landowners must continue to pay substantial taxes
despite severe police power restrictions.2 48 A New York court
in Arverne Bay Construction Co. v. Thatcher2 40 observed that
when regulations prevent all economic use of lands the only dis-
tinction between restriction and confiscation is the continued
burden of taxation in the former case.2 50
Taxation policies which reflect potential development values
rather than use value under zoning are likely to undercut any
open space regulation program. Lands are usually assessed to
reflect the potential development values without regard to exist-
ing land use regulations. One commentator has noted that such
assessment policies arise from the belief that if the market re-
248. See, e.g., Forde v. Miami Beach, 146 Fla. 176, 1 So. 2d 642
(1941); Morris County Land Imp. Co. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Tp.,
40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963); Averne Bay Construction Co. v.
Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938).
249. 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938).
250. Id. at 232, 15 N.E.2d at 592.
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quires more intensive use "the zoning will in time be changed."25 1
Yet it is inconceivable that long-term open space regulations will
be sustained where land is subject to high tax rates reflecting
potential development value. The right and left hands of gov-
ernment cannot be working against one another with the land-
owner in the middle.
One method of lessening the burden on severely regulated
landowners is to adjust property taxation to take into account
the lessened development potential of his lands. Tax adjust-
ments involving some form of preferential treatment for open or
undeveloped lands have been adopted in several states. Mary-
land in 1956 became the first state to adopt a broad tax adjust-
ment plan to encourage preservation of open spaces; since then
at least eight other jurisdictions have enacted legislation author-
izing comparable tax schemes. -2 52  Several tax adjustment ap-
proaches are available. (1) A statute can establish assessments
based upon regulated use value under the assumption that land
use controls applied to property are permanent in the absence of
clear proof to the contrary. (2) A statute might utilize simul-
taneous valuation of property at regulated use value and at po-
tential development value but assess taxes upon the regulated
use value unless lands are subsequently developed. At that time
all or a portion of the deferred tax on the development value
would be due. (3) Another approach deferring tax on develop-
ment value is most attractive for use in combination with those
open space regulations having a quasi-public benefit such as
preservation of natural flood storage areas. If a landowner is
subsequently permitted to develop his lands, only a percentage of
the total deferred taxes, rather than all, need be paid to compen-
sate for the benefit derived from open space use of the lands.
While preferential tax treatment is an attractive device to
lessen the burdens on severely restricted land owners and to en-
courage preservation of open space uses, a number of political,
administrative, constitutional, and other legal barriers beyond the
scope of this discussion often stand in the way of its use.2 5 3
251. Hagman, Open Space Planning and Property Taxation-Some
Suggestions, 1964 WIsc. L. REv. 628.
252. Moore, The Acquisition and Preservation of Open Lands, 23
WASH. & Lms L. REV. 274, 291 (1966). See also Note, Property Taxation
of Agricultural and Open Space Land, 8 HARv. 3. LEGIs. 158 (1970),
which discusses land taxation at use value and lists the special tax
incentive statutes of 19 states.
253. See generally Hagman, supra note 251, at 638-45.
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4. Regulations in Conjunction with Compensation or Purchase
The police power can be used to guide and limit land use,
but it cannot be used to allocate private lands to active public
uses. 25 4 Government purchase and eminent domain powers must
be utilized to provide land for public parks, swimming beaches,
flood storage areas, public parking lots, major wildlife areas, and
other public uses. The major objection to purchase is the ex-
pense. Costs, however, can be reduced through official mapping,
compensatory regulations, and easement purchase.
a. Official Mapping
Although official mapping is designed to restrict the con-
struction of houses or other improvements which would increase
purchase costs, 255 it is also an attractive regulatory technique
for preserving open space areas needed for future reservoir
sites,25 6 parks, or other public uses. While some existing statutes
authorize official mapping not only of streets but of future park
and drainage systems,257 the constitutionality of official mapping
for areas other than streets258 is as yet uncertain. Courts have
generally invalidated regulations as applied to specific properties
if the regulations prevent all structural development. 25 9 Often
the relatively narrow strips of land needed for streets occupy
small portions of lots, with considerable "buildable" space remain-
ing on each lot. On the other hand, official maps for parks, re-
servoir sites, wildlife areas or other uses will often affect whole
properties. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the well-known
case of Miller v. Beaver Falls260 held invalid a statute authoriz-
ing a park mapping plan and an accompanying ordinance which
froze development for three years prior to public purchase. The
254. See generally cases cited in notes 100-06 supra and accom-
panying text.
255. See generally Kucirek and Beuscher, Wisconsin's Official Map
Law, 1957 Wis. L. REV. 176; Waite, The Official Map and the Constitu-
tion in Maine, 15 MAINE L. REV. 3 (1963).
256. See IND. ANN. STAT. § 27-1901 et seq. (Supp. 1970). For dis-
cussion of other laws see C. OLSON, PRESERVATION OF RESERVOIR SITES
(1964).
257. See, e.g., N.Y. VILLAGE LAw § 179-e (McKinney 1966).
258. Constitutionality as applied to streets is unquestioned. See
cases cited in note 198 supra.
259. See, e.g., Roer Constr. Corp. v. New Rochelle, 207 Misc. 46,
136 N.Y.S.2d 414 (Sup. Ct. 1954). Generally the statutes allow issuance
of variances for structural uses if the official map prevents economic
use of land.
260. 368 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d 34 (1951).
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New Jersey court in New Jersey Lomarch Corp. v. Mayor of
Engewood 261 displayed a somewhat less critical attitude in up-
holding the constitutionality of a statute which granted a munic-
ipality a one year period to decide to purchase mapped parks
and playgrounds. However, the court read into the statute an
obligation of the municipality to pay for this one year "option"
to purchase.
Attempts to authorize official mapping of broad open space
areas might encounter similar difficulties. Several attempts to
map flood hazard areas have been invalidated by courts which
detected that a reduction in condemnation costs was among the
regulatory objectives. 26 2
b. Compensable Regulations
The concept of "compensable regulations" has been devel-
oped elsewhere.263 They are as yet only a proposed method of
lessening the burden of severe regulations on landowners. Sev-
eral courts have approved early zoning statutes20- 4 which pro-
261. 51 N.J. 108, 237 A.2d 881 (1968).
262. The trial court in Vartelas v. Water Resources Comm'n held
that a Connecticut encroachment law was unconstitutional because the
court felt that it had been enacted to save the government money in the
acquisition of rights of way for flood control works. (The trial court
opinion is cited in Dunham, Flood Control Via the Police Power, 107 U.
PA. L. REv. 1098, 1124 n.96 (1959), as "Unpublished opinion of Dube,
3., Court of Common Pleas, Judicial District of Waterbury, Conn.,
Docket No. 16,018, decided July 18, 1958.") This regulation and stat-
ute was subsequently upheld by the Connecticut Supreme Court, which
reversed the lower court. Vartelas v. Water Resources Comm'n, 146
Conn. 650, 153 A.2d 822 (1959). The Supreme Court did not consider
reduction in condemnation costs to be the objective of the statute or
regulations. See also Globe Realty Company v. Omaha, Doc. 569, No.
339 (Dist. Ct. of Douglas County, Nebraska, April 1967), in which the
court invalidated a setback ordinance which was enacted to depress
land values along creeks.
263. See Krasnowieki & Strong, Compensable Regulations for Open
Space: A Means of Controlling Urban Growth, 29 J. Avr. INs. PLn"-'mms
87 (1963); Krasnowieki and Paul, The Preservation of Open Space in
Metropolitan Areas, 110 U. PA. L. R v. 179 (1961).
264. In addition to the cases cited in note 265 infra, see Kansas City
v. Kindle, 446 S.W.2d 807 (Mo. 1969), in which the court upheld an
ordinance which restricted a district to residential use and provided
compensation to damaged landowners by means of a special assessment
levied upon benefited landowners within the district. The court held
that "[i]t is not necessary that the whole community or any large
part of the community be benefited by the condemnation. It is suffi-
cient if there is a benefit to any considerable number . ... " Id.
at 815.
In Attorney General v. Williams, 174 Mass. 476, 55 N.E. 77 (1899),
the court upheld a legislative act that prohibited erection of buildings
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vided compensation for damage done by restrictions. 2 5 Appar-
over 90 feet high on streets adjoining public parks and provided com-
pensation for affected landowners. In In re City of New York, 57 App.
Div. 166, 68 N.Y.S. 196 (1901), a law which widened a street 20 feet on
each side for use as ornamental courtyards, and which provided com-
pensation to landowners, was held constitutional. The court stated:
Conceding that the Legislature has the power to increase the
width of Clinton Avenue, that it would be justified in taking
possession of private property for this purpose upon the pay-
ment of just compensation, we are of opinion that it has a
right to take a lesser estate in the property than would be
necessary for a complete dedication to the use of the public, and
that the use is none the less public to the extent to which the
property is taken because it is left in the partial control of the
present owners.
Id at 172-73, 68 N.Y.S. at 200.
265. See, e.g., MN-N. STAT. § 462.12 et seq. (1971), which was ini-
tially enacted by Minn. Laws 1915, ch. 128. The statutory scheme per-
mits 50% of the landowners in a section of a first class city to petition
the city council to establish regulations prohibiting a range of nonresi-
dential uses including apartment buildings and billboards. Id. § 462.12.
The council is authorized to determine, through the use of appraisals,
the damages and benefits arising from the restrictions. Damaged land-
owners are to be paid by special assessments against benefited prop-
erties: "If the damages exceed the benefits to any particular piece, the
excess shall be awarded as damages. If the benefits exceed the damages
to any particular piece, the difference shall be assessed as benefits, but
the costs of the proceedings, including [fee, etc.] shall be added to the
amount to be assessed." Id. § 462.14(5). Assessments are to be in-
cluded in the next general tax list and collected in a separate account.
They may be collected in one to five equal installments. Id. § 462.15.
Buildings constructed in violation of the regulations may be abated as
public nuisances. Id. § 462.17.
The Minnesota Supreme Court first disapproved the statutory
scheme on the ground that payment of compensation to damaged prop-
erty owners was not for a valid public purpose. State ex rel. Twin
City Bldg. & Inv. Co. v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, 174 N.W. 885 (1919).
Later, the court reversed its decision and held that such condemna-
tion of development rights to nonresidential uses was for a valid public
purpose. State ex rel. Twin City Bldg. & Inv. Co. v. Houghton, 144
Minn. 1, 176 N.W. 159 (1920). The court later sustained a Minnea-
polis ordinance which excluded four-family buildings from a restricted
residential district. State ex rel. Berry v. Houghton, 164 Minn. 146,
204 N.W. 569 (1925). This was affirmed per curiam by the United
States Supreme Court. Berry v. Houghton, 273 U.S. 671 (1927).
In a 1954 case, the owner of a parcel in a restricted residential dis-
trict created between 1917 and 1922 brought suit to have a building
permit issued by the City of St. Paul for a fourplex dwelling declared
invalid and to enjoin remodeling of a structure as a fourplex. Burger
v. St. Paul, 241 Minn. 285, 64 N.W.2d 73 (1954). The court noted that
the board of zoning had recommended construction of the fourplex in
the restricted district. However, it held that the initial districting scheme
with the assessment of benefits and award of damages created a species
of property resembling negative equitable easements created by con-
tract. Id. at 299, 64 N.W.2d at 81. These property rights could not be
nullified or superseded by subsequent zoning and could not be taken
without payment of compensation.
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ently no state, however, has authorized a scheme of compensable
regulations under which open space lands would be mapped and
regulated in a manner similar to that for conventional zoning.
The zoning would constitutionally impose more stringent re-
strictions on land uses than would ordinarily be possible under
zoning by providing compensation to property owners for a por-
tion of the loss in land value caused by severe restrictions.
Property owners would be guaranteed a price for their lands at
least equal to the market value at the date of regulation. If
actual sales prices, after imposition of the regulation, were less
than the guaranteed prices, the governmental unit which had
imposed the restrictions would pay the difference. The amount
of the guarantee price, reduced by the payment of compensation
to previous owners, would remain as a guaranteed sale price for
a new owner.
This approach embodies an underlying assumption of the
1947 English Town and Country Planning Act that compensation
for development value must be determined as of the date of ini-
tial regulations.260  One of the biggest stumbling blocks in the
way of open space regulation is that in balancing the extent of
the property owner's harm against the societal benefit, courts
measure loss in speculative value. The Act squarely faced the
problem of gradually increasing potential development values
by "nationalizing" development rights as of 1947.207 All incre-
ments in land value attributable to presently practical develop-
ment as of 1947 were to be paid for by the state;208 increments
in value due to need for land and changed conditions after that
date were to be the property of the state. This was to be the
end of claims that denial of development permission took prop-
266. Town and Country Planning Act of 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 51.
For a comparison of English planning controls and American land use
controls see C. HAAR, LAND USE PLANNING IN A FREE Socnnr= (1951).
For a general discussion of English planning controls see Megarry,
Town and Country Planning in England: A Bird's Eye View, 13 CASE
W. REs. I REv. 619 (1962). Planning controls have been successfully
used to preserve open spaces. See D. MANDELKERR, GREEN BE.rs AN UR-
BAN GROWTH (1966). For a discussion of the compensation provisions of
the English controls see Mandelkerr, Notes trom the English: Compen-
sation in Town and Country Planning, 49 CAiw. L. REv. 699 (1961).
267. Town and Country Planning Act of 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 51,
§ 61.
268. Id. Landowners were to submit claims for loss of develop-
ment value defined as the difference between the value of land for any
potential use and the value for uses specified in Schedule III of the
Act (limited to existing uses). A once-and-for-all payment of such
claims was to be paid out of a global sum.
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erty without compensation. 269 The Act contemplated that when
planning permission was granted for a specific development pro-
posal the landowner would pay the government the full value
attributable to such permission. When land was sold the portion
of the sale price of land which reflected potential development
value of that land was also due the government. The whole
scheme was designed to assure equal treatment: the landowner
who was permitted to develop his land was to pay all the devel-
opment value over and above the present development value as
of 1947. This nicely conceived scheme discouraged land develop-
ment and was subject to serious administrative problems. It was
several times subjected to sweeping modifications. 270 By 1970, a
269. There are no constitutional provisions in the English law com-
parable to the fifth and fourteenth amendment guarantees of the U.S.
Constitution which prohibit the taking of private property without pay-
ment of just compensation. However, the English legal traditions of
property and individual autonomy have often given rise to strong po-
litical and judicial opposition to laws abridging property rights without
payment of compensation.
270. Acts adopted in 1953 and 1954 substantially modified the
compensation schemes. Town and Country Planning Act of 1953, 1 &
2 Eliz. 2, c. 16 abolished the development charge. Town and Country
Planning Act of 1954, 2 & 3 Eliz. 2, c. 72 authorized payment of claims
for compensation under Part VI of the 1947 Act only if a refusal of
planning permission caused damage.
Only a small percentage of claims for development value filed un-
der the 1947 Act had been paid by 1954. The 1954 Act recognized
these unpaid claims but established a procedure whereby new claims
needed to be submitted for payment of the balance of unpaid 1947
claims. Section 19 of the 1954 Act was reenacted as Town and Coun-
try Planning Act of 1962, 10 & 11 Eliz. 2, c. 38, § 100. New claims were
to be submitted if applications for specific new development were re-
fused. The claimants under the 1954 Act must have filed under the
1947 Act and the ceiling amount for their compensation was limited to
the 1947 claims. In essence the 1954 Act said "You have filed a claim
once, now you must file again under conditions of actual damage (re-
fusal of development permission) to receive the sum you once claimed."
This 1954 Act replaced the "all at once" scheme for payment for de-
velopment values as of 1947 by a scheme for case by case payment.
Provisions of the 1954 Act further restricted compensable claims where
applications had been refused or conditionally approved in a wide
variety of circumstances. See § 20 of the 1954 act, reenacted as § 101
of the 1962 act. Conditions may be attached to grants of planning con-
dition without giving rise to claims of compensation if the conditions
relate to:
(a) the number or disposition of buildings on any land;
(b) the dimensions, design, structure or external appearance
of any building, or the materials to be used in its con-
struction;
(c) the manner in which any land is to be laid out for the
purpose of the development, including the provision of fa-
cilities for the parking, loading, unloading or fuelling of
vehicle on the land;
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landowner who was granted development permission needed to
pay 50 per cent or more of the value attributable to the permis-
sion, but not 100 per cent as with the earlier schemes..2 7 1
Unless American courts discontinue giving considerable
weight to speculative increases in land value in their determina-
tions of whether a "taking" has occurred, it may be necessary to
follow the English example and compensate for development
values accruing at a fixed point in time and then to recognize no
further increases in such values.
While no state has enacted a sophisticated statute authoriz-
ing compensatory regulations, a statute embodying an important
element of this approach has been adopted and subjected to judi-
cial review. An Arizona court invalidated a statute authorizing
purchase of lands by the Arizona state highway department
within two years of the time the department passed a resolution
stating that a property was needed for highway purposes..
2 7 2
Land values were to be calculated as of the date of initial desig-
nation.
c. Purchase
(1) When regulations are invalid
An imaginative 1965 Massachusetts act for the protection of
wetlands authorizes the Commissioner of Natural Resources to
adopt orders for the protection of coastal wetlands.2 - 3 The stat-
ute authorizes landowners to appeal as of right to a court within
90 days of the order. If the court determines that the owner
cannot make practical use of his land, the court is directed to
(d) the use of any buildings or other land; or
(e) the location or design of any means of access to a highway,
or the materials to be used in the construction of any
such means of access.
Town and Country Planning Act of 1962, 10 & 11 Eliz. 2, c. 38, § 101 (2)
(a) - (c). Of interest are other sections which deny compensation
where the reasons stated for denial are that the proposed development
would be "premature' in terms of order of priority indicated in the
development plan, or if existing water or sewage services are inade-
quate but deficiencies are expected to be overcome within a reasonable
period of time. Id., § 101(3) (b). A further provision states that com-
pensation is not payable for a refusal if the stated reason is that "the
land is unsuitable for the proposed development on account of its lia-
bility to flooding or to subsidence." Id., § 101 (4).
271. See 1967 Land Commission Act of 1967, 11 Eliz. 2, c. 1, which
reinstated the development charge. See D. HEAP, INTRODUCING THE
LAND CoMISSox ACT (1967).
272. State v. Griggs, 89 Ariz. 70, 358 P.2d 174 (1960).
273. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 130, § 105 (1972).
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find that the order does not apply to the specific land. The com-
missioner may then take a fee or lesser interest in land by emi-
nent domainY 4  This approach deserves careful consideration
since it does not force government acquisition of lands but gives
government the option to purchase.
(2) To satisfy landowners
A later Massachusetts statute for the preservation of inland
wetlands has purchase provisions geared to landowner prefer-
ences rather than to the validity of restrictions.2 75 Landowners
may object to preservation orders within 90 days of their adop-
tion and the Conunissioner of Natural Resources has 90 days in
which to amend the order to the satisfaction of the applicant or
to purchase all or a part of the applicant's interest.
2 70
(3) Threat of acquisition
In 1961 Congress demonstrated imagination and innovation
in establishing the Cape Cod National SeashoreY.2 7 Much of the
land in the proposed seashore area was in private ownership;
acquisition of all these properties would have been expensive and
subject to political opposition, and would have removed lands
from township tax roles. To avoid these problems Congress au-
thorized the National Park Service to establish standards for
township land use regulations for private lands within the sea-
shore area. The Secretary of Interior was further authorized to
acquire lands if townships failed to adopt and enforce regulations
meeting federal standards. Affected townships have enacted
and enforced adequate regulations. 2 78 The successful "Cape Cod
formula" has been applied in other national park areas.270
(4) Easements acquisition
Easements are increasingly being used to prevent develop-
ment incompatible with public land use management objectives
274. Id.
275. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 131, § 40A (1972).
276. Id.
277. See Act of Aug. 7, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-126, 75 Stat. 284.
278. See, e.g., Town of Chatham, Mass., Protective By-law for
Chatham, § 3.5 Residence-Seashore Conservancy District 10 (1969);
Town of Provincetown, Mass., Zoning By-laws, § III-a, Class S, Sea-
shore District 5 (1968). Similar regulations have been adopted by
the towns of Truro, Wellfleet, Eastham, and Orleans which also have
lands within the National Seashore.
279. This formula has also been used in the Fire Island National
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while permitting continued private use and ownership. The lit-
erature on techniques for less than fee acquisition is rapidly
growing.280 Conservation, scenic, and flood control easements
may be appropriate for open space areas where little or no pri-
vate development is desirable and lands are not to be put to ac-
tive public use. Of course, discrimination arguments will un-
doubtedly arise if one land owner is regulated without compen-
sation and another in a similar situation is compensated through
easement purchase.
V. CONCLUSION
It is hoped this article will aid in the drafting of open space
regulations that will withstand constitutional attack. At pres-
ent, there are a number of factors and competing equities which
courts take into account in distinguishing between valid regula-
tion and taking. Drafting bodies should do likewise and should
also consider the various schemes available to ease the burden on
the regulated landowner. Open space zoning is significantly dif-
ferent than traditional zoning. Particularly because courts are
more hesitant to recognize the legitimacy of the exercise of the
police power to promote aesthetic objectives than others, and
because governmental units are increasingly discriminating by
paying some property owners to achieve these objectives while
regulating others, drafters of open space zoning regulations
should be conscious of the constitutional limitations.
Park and Olympia National Park. Similar regulations have been pro-
posed for Whiskey Town, California, and Indiana Dunes, Indiana.
280. See the following articles cited in Netherton, Implementation
of Land Use Policy: Police Power vs. Eminent Domain, 3 LAND &
WATER L. REv. 33, 47 n.30 (1968); Wisconsin Department of Resources
Development, Proceedings of Conservation Easements and Open Space
Conference (1961); Jordahl, Conservation and Scenic Easements: An
Experience Resume, 39 LAia EcoN. 343 (1963); University of Wisconsin,
Workshop Manual for Conference on Scenic Easements in Action (De-
cember 16-17, 1966); California Department of Public Works, The Scenic
Route: A Guide for the Designation of an Official Scenic Highway(1966); U.S. Department of Commerce, Report on Recommendations
for Land Acquisition, Scenic Easements, and Control of Access for the
Great River Road in Wisconsin (1966) (prepared for the President's
Council on Recreation and Natural Beauty).
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